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I.

INTRODUCTION

The on-demand economy has truly gone global. Consider online
platform TaskRabbit, a U.S.-based site for odd jobs.1 A high number of
TaskRabbit’s users were seeking help with the construction of furniture
they purchased at IKEA, and skilled carpenters started using the
platform to find customers.2 Corporate management at Swedish
company IKEA noticed the trend, and as a result acquired TaskRabbit
in 2017.3 As a result, a Swedish company now owns a platform labor
service in the United States and Britain, with plans to expand the
TaskRabbit platform to twenty-seven more countries where IKEA
currently owns brick and mortar stores.4 Throughout its operation,
however, TaskRabbit has claimed it only has a handful of employees,
and the terms and conditions on its website list its workers as
“independent contractors.”5

1.
2.

TASKRABBIT, https://taskrabbit.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
See Trisha Thadani, Behind IKEA’s Purchase of TaskRabbit, Amazon Looms,
SFGATE (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:31 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Behind-Ikea-spurchase-of-Taskrabbit-amazon-12239062.php.
3.
Cf. Richard Milne, IKEA Looks for Further Deals After TaskRabbit Purchase, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/79661ccc-ada0-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130
(describing further acquisitions following the purchase of TaskRabbit).
4.
Brian Fung, IKEA Has Purchased TaskRabbit, Because #adulting Is Hard, WASH.
POST (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/28/ikeahas-purchased-taskrabbit-to-help-you-bypass-those-assembly-instructions/?noredirect=on.
5.
Jeff John Roberts, IKEA’s Latest Acquisition Will Help Assemble Your IKEA
Furniture, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/09/28/ikea-task-rabbit/.
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Two other examples effectively illustrate the global nature of ondemand work. Digital platform Upwork, headquartered in Mountain
View, California, hosts and parcels out assorted computer
programming, graphic design, and data-entry tasks.6 Upwork posts
tasks from requesters around the world, and likewise, the workers on
the platform live around the world, most often working from their
homes.7 A final example is U.K. company Chatterbox, which uses its
platform to connect remote workers in Syrian refugee camps with users
in many other countries who pay to learn Arabic.8 In the past, foreign
companies have used platforms to engage Kenyan nationals living in
refugee camps with tasks as diverse as computer programming and
customer support calls.9
On-demand platforms are changing and reshaping our
conceptions of both the firm and work relationship in far-reaching and
critical ways, allowing companies to hire workers and to seek
customers across national boundaries.10 Meanwhile, as on-demand
platforms have scaled their operations in the last decade, regulators
6.
See Erika Fry, The Gig Economy Isn’t Just for Startups Anymore, FORTUNE (Aug.
29, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/08/29/the-gig-economy-isnt-just-for-startups-anymore/
(noting Fortune 500 companies outsourcing tasks to platforms like Upwork); see also Mariya
Aleksynska et al., Work on Digital Labour Platforms in Ukraine: Issues and Policy
Perspectives, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (ILO) (2018), https://www.ilo.org/travail/WCMS_635
370/lang--en/index.htm (discussing how Ukraine ranks fourth for work on digital labour
platforms and the consequences for labour market and society); Carey Wodehouse, What Kind
of Freelance Talent Can You Hire Through Upwork?, UPWORK (Nov. 14, 2017), https://
www.upwork.com/hiring/for-clients/kinds-of-freelancers-on-upwork/ (listing types of work
available on the Upwork platform).
7.
The nations supplying the most labor on Upwork are India, Philippines, Ukraine,
Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, United States, China, Canada, Poland, Belarus, Romania,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Argentina, Serbia, Armenia, Germany, and Egypt. The diversity of these
supplier countries demonstrates the truly global nature of these platforms. See John Horton et
al., Digital Labour Markets and Global Talent Flows tbl.3B (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper
No. 17-096, 2017), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17-096_813abb74-09c54ea6-989f-5ef03b2d7f31.pdf.
8.
Lorraine Charles, How Remote Work Could Help Refugees, WORLD ECON. F.
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/remote-work-could-help-refugees/
(noting language tutoring and computer programming work in Syrian refugee camps and
encouraging the growth of such work).
9.
See Stephanie Hegarty, How Silicon Valley Outsources Work to African Refugees,
BBC NEWS (June 18, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13784487; Our Impact,
SAMASOURCE, https://www.samasource.com/our-impact (last visited Nov. 21, 2019).
10. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 19 (2006). Also note the use of the terms “on-demand”
or “gig work,” rather than the terminology of the “sharing economy.” The author believes that
“sharing” is a misnomer, given that systems of platform work involve remuneration and
participation on these platforms is highly commoditized. See Miriam A. Cherry, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Crowdwashing in the Gig Economy, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1 (2018).
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around the world have struggled to keep pace with the challenges to
labor regulation that platforms have presented.11 While some
commentators believe existing forms of labor and employment
regulations can stretch to cover on-demand work,12 others have called
for new legal initiatives specifically crafted for online platforms.13
Confronted with low pay and problematic working conditions,14 gig
workers around the world have turned to the courts, attempting to
invoke the protections of traditional labor and employment law.15 Court
cases were first seen in the United States, where many platforms had
their origins.16 As the platforms have spread to many countries, similar
11. Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work,
37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584-85 (2016) [hereinafter Cherry, Digital Transformation
of Work] (listing lawsuits about employment in the gig economy filed in the United States and
discussing the digital transformation of work).
12. See JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF WORK
IN THE GIG ECONOMY 78 (2018) (noting similarities between old forms of work and new forms
of work, in instances like “open calls” for work by stevedores on the docks); see also Matthew
W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in Historical Perspective, 37 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 603, 608 (2016) (drawing links between piecework and homework in traditional
industrialization and computer crowdwork).
13. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, DISCUSSION PAPER
2015-10, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK:
THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 2 (Dec. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf (proposing a
third intermediate category of “independent worker” located in between employee and
independent contractor); see, e.g., Vin Gurrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee
Classification, LAW360 (May 6, 2016, 8:50 PM), https:///www.law360.com/articles/793584/
print?section=classaction; see also Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent
Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 650-56
(2017) (discussing a comparative and historical approach to the third category).
14. See Mark R. Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/asking-tough-questionsabout-the-gig-economy/2015/06/18/b43f2d0a-1461-11e5-9ddc-e3353542100c_story.html. In
the 2016 ILO study, crowdworkers were asked about the upsides and downsides of their work
and there were some common themes. Complaints about low pay were common. The ILO data
show that American crowdworkers averaged $5.55 an hour, below the federal minimum wage
of $7.25 an hour. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (2018). Many crowdworkers in
the ILO survey remarked that they had high search costs, i.e., that it took them a long time to
find appropriate tasks on the website, so that they spent more time looking for work than they
actually spent doing it. Still others noted that their work could be rejected by the requester on
a summary basis, without reasons provided. All of these led to dissatisfaction among those
surveyed. Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers 14-15 (ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment
Series No. 74, Working Paper, 2016) [hereinafter Berg, Income Security].
15. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11 (listing the ongoing
litigation surrounding the on-demand economy in the United States); see also SARAH KESSLER,
GIGGED: THE END OF THE JOB AND THE FUTURE OF WORK 111 (2018) (“Soon it was difficult to
find any company that brokered independent workers and didn’t have a lawsuit on its hands.”).
16. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11.
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types of litigation have followed in their wake. Currently, cases are
being heard around the world on the question of whether gig workers
are “employees” or “independent contractors.”17 These include
ongoing litigation in the United Kingdom,18 Brazil,19 Spain,20
Belgium,21 Colombia,22 and Australia.23 So far, these decisions have
applied different standards, and to date have been reaching conflicting
conclusions.24
Despite crowdwork being a genuine global system of work, these
precedents set the stage for inconsistent rulings and conflicts of law.
Transnational ownership and international worker participation on
crowdwork platforms present timely and compelling business,
technology, and labor law questions. Many digital platforms are truly
multinational enterprises, and we can expect to see difficult compliance
issues come into play for these businesses. Within the next decade, the
spread of online crowdwork will result in even more litigation, creating
difficult questions in the labyrinth of rules that comprise private
international law, i.e., jurisdiction, choice of law, and conflicts of law.25
17. Valerio De Stefano, Platform Work and Labour Protection. Flexibility Is Not
Enough, REG. FOR GLOBALIZATION BLOG (May 23, 2018), http://regulatingforglobalization.
com/2018/05/23/platform-work-labour-protection-flexibility-not-enough/ [hereinafter De
Stefano, Platform Work].
18. For more on the situation in the United Kingdom and Europe, see, for example,
Anna Birtwistle & Clare Murray, Around the World in 80 Ubers: Is the Law Keeping Up with
the Uberisation of Work in Europe?, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (July 7, 2017), https://whoswholegal.
com/features/features/around-the-world-in-80-ubers-is-the-law-keeping-up-with-the-uberisationof-work-in-europe.
19. Maria Cristina Frias, Uber Drivers Are Employees, Court Decides in Brazil,
FOLHA DE S. PAULO (Aug. 28, 2018, 12:18 PM), https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/
en/business/2018/08/uber-drivers-are-employees-court-decides-in-brazil.shtml.
20. De Stefano, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. Rico, Court Rules Against Uber and Its 83,000 Drivers, TODAY COLOM. (Jan. 19,
2018), http://todaycolombia.com/court-rules-against-uber-and-its-83000-drivers/ (noting
Colombia’s Corte Constitutional decision requiring Uber to comply with employment laws as
well as laws applying to taxi companies).
23. See discussion infra Part II; see also Ignasi Beltran de Heredia Ruiz, Employment
Status of Platform Workers, UNA MIRADA CRÍTICA A LAS RELACIONES LABORALES (Dec. 9,
2018), https://ignasibeltran.com/2018/12/09/employment-status-of-platform-workers-nationalcourts-decisions-overview-australia-brazil-chile-france-italy-united-kingdom-united-statesspain/#%C3%ADndice (listing court cases across various jurisdictions). For Australia, see
Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford, Regulating Work in the Gig Economy: What Are the
Options?, 28 ECON. & LAB. REV. 420, 425-29 (2017) (noting uncertainty as to the legal status
of gig workers).
24. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17; see discussion infra Part III.
25. In Europe, the legal terminology used for these concepts is “private international
law.” While both terms are used interchangeably in this Article, I tend to prefer “conflicts of
law” as the term seems more expressive.
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Jurisdiction refers to the ability of a court to decide a dispute.26 Choice
of law pertains to the law that a court with jurisdiction will apply.27
Conflicts of law is the body of law determining, in the absence of a
choice-of-law provision, what law to apply when a foreign element is
involved.28 At the moment the pending cases about the on-demand
economy have largely focused on the issue of employee/independent
contractor status.29 Misclassification, however, is only the threshold
question. Beyond the threshold of employee status lies additional
issues, such as the application of substantive rights for workers that
vary drastically depending on the law that is applied.30 For example,
minimum wage and working time laws vary drastically depending on
which jurisdiction’s laws are applied.31 The same is true for collective
bargaining, worker’s compensation, or unemployment insurance.32
Different countries’ conflicts-of-law rules could potentially yield
different answers for each phase of doctrinal law and policy.
The conundrum is that work has traditionally been conceived of
as a localized activity, largely regulated on a national basis, while the
26. LOUISE MERRETT, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 2
(2011). But see Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
319 (2002) (using “jurisdiction” to stand in not only for the concept of being able to hear a
dispute, but also to the determination that a certain jurisdiction’s law will apply).
27. MERRETT, supra note 26.
28. See GEERT VAN CALSTER, EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2d ed.
2016).
29. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.
30. Basic rights, like the freedom to organize and bargain collectively as part of a
union, rest on the outcome of the classification debate, and in many legal systems, only
“employees” have these types of rights. See Hannah Johnston & Chris Land-Kazlauskas,
Organizing On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective Bargaining in the Gig
Economy 2 (ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 94, Working Paper, 2019).
Classification can also have implications for intellectual property rights. California law states
that employers own the work of their employees under the work made for hire, but there is no
such rule for independent contractors. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351.5(c) (West 2019); CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 686, 621(b) (West 2019); Matthew Swanlund, Work Made for Hiring,
L.A. LAW., Mar. 2016, at 25, 25 (“California businesses face a critical decision . . . . They may
take advantage of the benefits afforded by the work-made-for-hire doctrine . . . but be treated
under California law as an employer, or they may sacrifice the benefits of the work-made-forhire doctrine yet maintain the independent contractor status of [their] creative workers.”).
31. See Miriam A. Cherry, Mindestlohm für Crowdarbeit? [A Minimum Wage for
Crowdwork?], in CROWDWORK-ZURÜCK IN DIE ZUKUNFT? PERSPEKTIVEN DIGITALER ARBEIT
[CROWDWORK—BACK TO THE FUTURE? PERSPECTIVES ON DIGITAL LABOR] 231-40 (2014)
(Ger.) (chapter translated into German for book publication); Miriam A. Cherry, Working for
(Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA.
L. REV. 1077, 1093-94 (2009).
32. For example, most crowdwork websites lack a way to verify with certainty that
they are free of child labor; they rely almost entirely on self-reporting and self-certification of
age.
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incontrovertible fact is that many crowdwork platforms either are or
aspire to become genuine multinational enterprises.33 With crowdwork
performed wholly on the computer, like the Upwork example, the
company or person who is ordering work could be located in one
nation, the platform itself could be located in a second nation, and the
workers could be located in many other nations.34 Indeed, the
innovative promise of crowdwork lies in its global nature, allowing
more workers and companies to participate.35 Global crowdwork can
take advantage of temporal differences (the shift in time zones around
the world) as well as allowing companies to hire skilled workers,
regardless of their location.
For on-demand platforms, this may present difficult legal
compliance problems. Currently some platforms have aspirations of
becoming “global workspaces,” hosting both requesters and workers
from dozens of countries.36 At the moment, there is a void in
regulation.37 However, as courts continue to make decisions and
countries begin to pass laws with differing and particular regulations
requiring compliance, those laws will likely not be uniform between
nations. The need to calculate dozens of minimum wages or to comply
with various procedural and administrative rules will likely result in
time-consuming and potentially costly compliance issues for
platforms. While platforms may attempt to engage in self-help through
private ordering through the terms and conditions of online contracts,
some labor and employment laws are considered mandatory or
nonwaivable.38 Such practices might also raise a concern about forum
shopping, or the “race to the bottom” in labor standards.39

33. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 471, 487 (2010) [hereinafter Cherry, Global Dimensions] (describing transnational work
relationships within video games and in virtual worlds).
34. Aniket Kittur et al., The Future of Crowd Work, CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED
COOPERATIVE WORK & SOC. COMPUTING 1301 (2013), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=2441923.
35. Cherry, Global Dimensions, supra note 33, at 483.
36. Miriam A. Cherry & Winifred R. Poster, Crowdwork, Corporate Social
Responsibility, and Fair Labor Practices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATIONS 291 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016).
37. Cherry, Global Dimensions, supra note 33, at 487.
38. See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 156 (2005); Alex Rosenblat
& Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s
Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758, 3764 (2016).
39. For a discussion of arbitration in the on-demand economy, see Charlotte Garden,
Disrupting Work Law: Arbitration in the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205 (2017).
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These are challenging sets of problems. The beginnings of
solutions may be found by thinking about other regulatory structures
that exist outside of territorial boundaries. Here, specifically, I make
reference to the recently passed General Data Protection Regulation in
the European Union,40 which has extraterritorial application to the
protection of privacy; to the international rules that govern employment
of transportation workers, specifically those engaged in maritime
employment; and to the corporate codes of conduct and social
responsibility followed by many multinational companies.41 In
essence, we can profit from thinking about on-demand platforms as
another way that labor moves through the global supply chains, except
that those supply chains are for services, not products.
The goal of this Article is to provide a global framework for
thinking about the on-demand business model and these assorted
conflicts-of-law and jurisdictional issues.42 Part II provides the
theoretical background, supplied by labor and employment law
scholarship. As Part II notes, the on-demand model provides a
challenge to the received wisdom that employment is inherently local.
Part III then discusses the specific context of on-demand crowdwork,
providing background themes, an explanation of the legal issues, and a
survey of the current state of the literature. Part IV analyzes the
jurisdiction and conflict-of-law issues through the lenses of three
jurisdictions that are of great importance to crowdwork: California, the
European Union, and India. Part IV also looks at terms of use and
forum selection clauses. As the toolkit of private international law
provides few definite answers, Part V looks at alternative ways of
thinking about regulation, drawing parallels to the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), international maritime
law, and multinational codes of conduct and corporate social
responsibility. Throughout, this Article emphasizes the need for further
coordinated multilateral study, discussion, and regulatory action to
assist both crowdworkers and businesses as they navigate the ondemand model of production.

40. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (EU).
41. See discussion infra Part V.
42. While this Article formulates an initial framework and adumbrates the issues in
three jurisdictions, this Article is not intended as a comprehensive study of how each
jurisdiction across the world would approach these issues. Apart from treaties like the Rome
Convention, each national legal system has its own method for determining jurisdiction,
choice-of-law, and conflicts-of-law issues.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Previous scholarship provides the context for discussing the
jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and conflict-of-law issues that arise around
transnational employment relationships. For many decades, labor and
employment lawyers tended to neglect jurisdictional issues; and
lawyers who were studying conflicts of law tended to ignore labor law
issues.43 In 1984, International Labour Organization (ILO) attorney
Felice Morgenstern wrote the first English full-length treatment of the
intersection of these fields in her book entitled International Conflicts
of Labour Law.44 Morgenstern described complex sets of legal issues
that she had encountered at the ILO, all of which dealt with labor and
employment issues involving a “foreign element.”45 The book covered
many of the issues raised by the employment of itinerant workers,
posted workers, offshoring and outsourcing operations, and labor
relations within multinational corporations.46
Within her book and a preceding article,47 Morgenstern notes the
development of rules and concepts surrounding transnational
employment. As her book describes, some approaches looked at the
location of the contract’s execution, while others looked at the domicile
and nationality of the parties or the location of the company’s
headquarters, and still others to the location where the work occurred.48
Overall, however, Morgenstern noted that the received wisdom seemed
to converge on the idea of looking at the physical location of where the
work took place, supplemented by the law of the employing firm’s
43. See, e.g., Martin Franzen, Conflicts of Laws in Employment Contracts and
Industrial Relations, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 245, 245 (Roger Blanpain ed., 11th ed. 2014) (“Truly
international sources governing conflicts of law in our field [labor and employment law] are
not numerous, though of growing importance.”).
44. FELICE MORGENSTERN, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS OF LABOUR LAW: A SURVEY
OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT RELATION (1984). This was the
first book-length treatment of the subject to appear in the English language, and it cited and
quoted cases from around the world. Rolf Birk, International Conflicts of Labour Law, 79 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1120, 1120 (1985) (book review) (“The book is, in fact, the first English-language
monograph on international conflicts of labor law.”).
45. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 1.
46. Id. passim.
47. Felice Morgenstern & Blaise Knapp, Multinational Enterprises and the
Extraterritorial Application of Labour Law, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 769, 770 (1978).
48. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 61-64. For more on the triangular nature of the
relationship with the platform, see Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, TaskRabbit, and Co.:
Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 619, 634 (2016).
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“home base.”49 Her approach was doctrinal and practical, looking to
statutes and case law, where applicable.
Since that time, the intersection of labor and private international
law as a doctrinal category has received only sporadic interest from
academics. Within the United States, there is some attention to the issue
when the employment laws of one state conflict with another state’s
laws. Most notably, the fact that California bans noncompetition
agreements (while other states recognize them) has prompted a
discussion among legal scholars.50 In the European Union, scholars
have tended to focus on the impact and application of the rules around
the Rome Regulation.51 These accounts and ones like it tend to be more
practical than theoretical.52 There has also been a robust discussion
about the longstanding issues with posted workers throughout the
European Union, as well as workers who live on one side of a border
yet work in another.53 In all of this scholarship, which is focused on the
practical outcomes for certain groups of workers or multinational
companies, employment law is generally conceived of as largely a local
issue.54
During the approximately thirty-five years between when
Morgenstern was writing and the date of this Article, the globalization

49. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 121 (“Many of the conflicts and uncertainties
inherent in the subject would seem to be due to the difficulty of establishing a clear dividing
line between the legitimate scope of the law of the place of work and that of the home base
. . . .”).
50. Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1381, 1386-87 (2008); Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee
Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389, 389
(2010); Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 941-43
(2012).
51. See MERRETT, supra note 26; Uglješa Grušić, Jurisdiction in Employment Matters
Under Brussels I: A Reassessment, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 91, 97-99 (2012).
52. See MERRETT, supra note 26; Grušić, supra note 51.
53. See Cecilia Pérez Martínez, Where Will the Case Be Heard? Which Is the
Applicable Law? Approach to Selected Problems of Transnational Employment Relationships,
5 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 5, 5-6 (2015).
54. See, e.g., Ron McCallum, Conflicts of Laws and Labour Law in the New Economy,
16 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 50, 52 (2003) (“Throughout history, the performance of paid work has
been a local affair. This is because workers are flesh and blood human beings who live in
family groups, and who undertake employment to support themselves and their families by
earning money to provide food, shelter, clothing, recreation and the education of children.”);
see also Martínez, supra note 53 (“[L]abor and employment has always been regulated locally
and for local employee-employer relationships. Traditionally, domestic regulations have not
contemplated transnational employment relationships . . . .”).
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of work and the pace of technological change has vastly accelerated.55
In the words of Professor Marie-Ange Moreau, “[t]he relationship
between time, place, and space of action has . . . changed in profound
ways” due to technology and globalization.56 Legal doctrine, Professor
Moreau argues, has yet to “come to conceptual terms with this
transnationalization.”57 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, legal theorists
such as Katherine Van Wezel Stone began to grapple with transnational
labor law as well as problems of labor standards in the global supply
chain.58
In his 2001 article Labour Law Beyond Borders, Professor Patrick
Macklem noted that flexible forms of production and economic
globalization were creating profound challenges for systems of labor
and employment law traditionally based on national regulation.59 As a
counterweight, Macklem pointed to international minimum standard
setting by the ILO, the insertion of human rights norms and labor
standards in trade liberalization treaties, and multinational firms’
corporate codes of conduct and social responsibility.60
In 2009, Professor Guy Mundlak picked up on Macklem’s
proposals, emphasizing the need to de-territorialize labor law.61 In his
article, Mundlak argues that with the ongoing process of globalization,
the territorial solutions previously created within labor law are no
longer adequate.62 Interestingly, he suggests identifying the location of
the ultimate beneficiaries of products and services as the appropriate
place to look for labor and employment regulation.63 As Mundlak puts
it, “Regulation of the labor market should be associated with the de-

55. Marie-Ange Moreau, The Reconceptualization of the Employment Relationship
and Labor Rights Through Transnationality, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 697, 697 (2013).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 698.
58. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987 (1995) (examining
the challenges to domestic and international labor regulation); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To
the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 93 (1999) (discussing certain “survival necessities” of global labor workers).
59. Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 605
(2002).
60. Id. at 637-45.
61. See Guy Mundlak, De-Territorializing Labor Law, 3 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS.
189, 189 (2009).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 212.
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facto employment relationship, as viewed in terms of social and
economic reliance.”64
International expert Professor Harry Arthurs has also discussed
transnational labor law extensively. In his article Extraterritoriality by
Other Means, Arthurs notes that labor law has a tendency to “sneak” or
to be smuggled across borders.65 Sometimes one state’s laws present a
strategy or template for the law in another country, as Arthurs notes is
true of the United States and Canada.66 Other times, multinational
companies import their own standards and norms into the countries
where they employ workers.67 This can be a positive experience for
workers, raising local standards; or multinationals can receive
exemptions even from lower standards, because some governments are
desperate for foreign investment.68
In light of this theoretical background, computer crowdwork on
global technological platforms presents a unique and almost existential
challenge for traditional territorial thinking. In essence, crowdwork
turns the dependence on national systems for regulation of employment
and labor law upside down. The received wisdom in private
international law doctrine, which is based on territoriality, physical
presence, and habitual place of work fundamentally does not comport
with the global nature of crowdwork. While theorists such as Arthurs,
Stone, Macklem, and Mundlak have all noted this disconnect as it
pertained to earlier forms of globalized work and global supply chains,
computer crowdwork puts these issues into even sharper relief.69 With
this theory in place, we now turn to examine how platform businesses
have truly “gone global.”

64. Id.
65. Harry Arthurs, Extraterritoriality by Other Means: How Labor Law Sneaks Across
Borders, Conquers Minds, and Controls Workplaces Abroad, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 527,
529 (2010) [hereinafter Arthurs, Extraterritoriality] (“[L]abor laws in fact ‘sneak across
borders’ relatively unconstrained by the extraterritoriality doctrine . . . .”).
66. Id. at 534-35; see also Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global
Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 279 (2001)
(describing the adoption of American labor laws in Canada).
67. Arthurs, Extraterritoriality, supra note 65, at 540.
68. See id. at 544; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our Boundaries:
Transnational Employment Law Practice and the Export of American Lawyering Styles to the
Global Worksite, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 257, 321-22 (2004) (noting the development of
lawyering styles to accommodate clients seeking less regulation).
69. Arthurs, Extraterritoriality, supra note 65; Macklem, supra note 59; Mundlak,
supra note 61; Stone, supra note 58 (referring to both).
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III. THE GLOBAL REACH OF PLATFORM BUSINESSES
A.

Background on Platform Development

Overviews of how on-demand platforms operate are by now wellcovered in the popular press70 and the academic literature.71 In 2016, a
survey by Time Magazine found that over forty-five million people in
the United States were working in the “gig,” “on-demand,” or
“sharing” economy.72 Since the time of that study, the popularity of
online platforms has continued to grow around the world, making gig
work a truly global phenomenon.73 As the vanguard of these trends
toward more flexible and contingent work, labor in the on-demand
economy has received both its share of positive and negative attention
in the media and in the courts. Positive news stories focus on the
opportunities generated for people who need and want more flexible
days and more flexible hours than a typical forty-hour-a-week job

70. Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine,
NATION (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-ghostsdigital-machine/.
71. As such, this Part has been adapted from the Author’s earlier work that described
the particular features, structures, economics, and legal issues of the gig economy. See Cherry,
Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11. See generally Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized
Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig
Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653 (2016) (presenting case study analysis
of on-demand platforms and their terms of service); Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating
Employment Relationships in the Sharing Economy, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2016)
(discussing how the sharing economy demonstrates an employment relationship that demands
a regulatory response); Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: OnDemand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 471 (2016) (analyzing opportunities and risks within the gig economy using the
lens of labor protection); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016)
(arguing the platform economy presents a paradigm shift for business); Benjamin Means &
Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016) (arguing
that flexibility in time, place, manner, and frequency should determine work classification);
Brishen Rodgers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015)
(discussing Uber’s impact on the car-hire sector, its standards, and the future of low-wage
work).
72. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6,
2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/. According to a 2016 report from the
Congressional Research Service, if temporary work, on-call work, part-time work, and “selfemployment” in the United States are included in this trend, the issues around alternative work
arrangements have an impact on nearly one-third of the labor force. See SARAH A. DONOVAN
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44365, WHAT DOES THE GIG ECONOMY MEAN FOR
WORKERS? 4-7 (2016).
73. JANINE BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS AND THE FUTURE OF WORK:
TOWARDS DECENT WORK IN THE ONLINE WORLD 29 (2018) [hereinafter BERG ET AL., DIGITAL
LABOUR PLATFORMS].
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would provide.74 Sharing websites and mobile apps also may provide a
quick and easy way for customers to seek out assistance. Negative
stories, on the other hand, focus on the terms and conditions of the
work, including a lack of benefits and opportunity for advancement.75
These stories detail the uncertainty of on-demand platforms for
workers, the low rates of pay provided on some platforms, and the
amount of unpaid search time that goes into finding the next gig.76 Ever
since Uber became a popular app, most people have at least a passing
familiarity with how on-demand platforms operate.77 Accordingly, the
background provided herein is streamlined.
The on-demand business model has offered important
innovations; instead of buying or selling a good, users of certain
platforms could rent access to what they needed.78 A driver with a car
could transform an ordinary morning commute into a profit-generating
enterprise by picking up a passenger on Uber or Lyft. Other websites,
like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, crowdsourced computer tasks to a
global market of workers, using only very small slices of time.79
Websites that were part of “prosumer” movements involved customers
in design or marketing decisions, only to then sell them products.80
These business models in and of themselves were different compared
to the standard models of sales that firms had typically employed.
The specifics and mechanics may differ, but crowdworking
platforms share common characteristics. Through a market-making
function they create an “open call” that then matches discrete tasks to
the on-demand workers.81 One category of on-demand work involves
tasks that take place in the real world, and that are powered by a website
or app.82 Well-known examples include websites and apps that range
74. Charles, supra note 8.
75. Marvit, supra note 70; Kittur et al, supra note 34.
76. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 15, at 78-79 (noting call center platforms that
advertised paying minimum wage, as if that were something to brag about).
77. MadeinTYO, Uber Everywhere, YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=BcyFJLrBVhA (not-safe-for-work rap about taking Uber everywhere because
of its ubiquity); cf. Brian De Los Santos, Rapper Who Got Famous off Uber Declares Beef, Is
Switching to Lyft, MASHABLE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/01/30/madeintyohates-uber/ (noting rapper’s change of heart toward Uber).
78. Cf. KESSLER, supra note 15, at 46 (describing an art rental platform).
79. See Steinmetz, supra note 72.
80. JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE
FUTURE OF BUSINESS 1-4 (2008) (describing the “Threadless” website).
81. Steinmetz, supra note 72. Some platforms set prices, while others have an auction
function that allow requesters to bid and the workers to accept bids.
82. Id.
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from Uber (ridesharing),83 GrubHub (food delivery),84 and Handy
(home repair).85 The other category, exemplified by Upwork or by
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), involves completion of computer
tasks online. On these computer sites, the requests, the hosting, and the
work itself are all performed online.86
A convergence of critical thought and attention is beginning to
crystalize around the gig economy, contained in the popular press, in
computer science accounts, sociological studies, economic studies, in
business schools, in law reviews, and in the courts. Various accounts
have emerged that document and analyze key characteristics of ondemand platforms: (1) reliance upon, and placement within, the
information society;87 (2) the globalization of the platforms, the
requesters, and the workforces involved;88 (3) dependence on trust and
reputation proxies such as rating systems;89 (4) use of big data and
surveillance to track work and workers;90 (5) use of just-in-time
scheduling of labor relations;91 and (6) the management of workers by
algorithm.92
While the traditional employment relationship involved a steady
forty-hour work week, hierarchical structure and advancement, along
with accompanying benefits, the on-demand model instead stresses
limited commitment and extreme flexibility.93 Rather than having an
assigned employee take on tasks as work arises, work is broken down
into smaller pieces and placed out via Internet or cellular phone app on
an “open call.”94 Workers sign in and complete tasks at their own pace
and on their own time. There are no obligations of the worker or the
platform to each other past the conclusion of one particular gig or

83. UBER, www.uber.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
84. GRUBHUB, www.grubhub.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
85. HANDY, www.handy.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
86. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17, makes the distinction between work
performed entirely in cyberspace and work that originates on an app or Internet platform, and
then is performed in the “real world.” See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1-3.
87. Cherry & Poster, supra note 36, at 294.
88. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 595.
89. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 38, at 3775.
90. Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L.
REV. 961, 962, 988 (2017).
91. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.
92. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 38, at 3762.
93. Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 598-99.
94. HOWE, supra note 80.
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task.95 Yet systems of surveillance sit atop the workflow, and
algorithmic management controls and directs work activities.96
B.

Conflicting Law in the Gig Economy

A recurring critical legal issue in considering work in the ondemand economy stems from confusion over the proper employment
classification of platform workers. Many platforms have labeled
workers who used their platforms as “independent contractors” through
terms of service listed on a website or on a mobile app.97 The matter of
employment classification, however, is not decided by a company’s
label or terms of service. Rather, courts determine classification based
on a number of factors, primarily the amount of control exerted over
the worker or how the work is performed, and whether the workers
look like an independent business, based on their indicia of
entrepreneurial activity.98 Classification as an employee is a “gateway”
to determine who deserves the protections of labor and employment
laws, including the right to organize, minimum wage, and
unemployment compensation, to name just a few of the benefits that
are part and parcel of employee status.99 As such, classification as an
employee is actually “an important instrument for the delivery of
workers’ rights.”100
Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor is determined through various multifactor tests dependent on
the facts of the relationship.101 The “control” test derives from case law
95. Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 596; see also Garden,
supra note 39 (discussing arbitration agreements in the on-demand economy).
96. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 38, at 3762, 3765.
97. Miriam A. Cherry, The Sharing Economy and the Edges of Contract Law:
Comparing U.S. and U.K. Approaches, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1804, 1809 (2017) [hereinafter
Cherry, The Sharing Economy].
98. Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 582.
99. Finkin, supra note 12, at 611.
100. Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as
a Viable (Though Over-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 133, 134 (Guy Davidov & Brian
Langille eds., 2006).
101. See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006) [hereinafter Stone, Legal Protections] (listing
factors from the cases); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)
(examining the definition of “employee” in the FLSA); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,
331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947) (defining what it means to “employ” a worker); Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1968) (considering the scope of
employment in a maritime case).
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and decisions on agency law and focuses on a principal’s right to
control the worker.102 In brief, the factors for finding employee status
are whether the employer may direct the way in which the work is
performed, determine the hours involved, and provide the employee
with direction.103 On the other hand, elements that lean toward
independent contractor classification include high-skilled work,
workers providing their own equipment, workers setting their own
schedules, and getting paid per project, not per hour.104 In an alternate
test, courts examine the economic realities of the relationship to
determine whether the worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial activity, or
whether the worker is financially dependent upon the employer.105 A
third test that has recently been gaining ground is the ABC test.106
Under all these tests, the label affixed to the relationship is a factor in
the outcome, but it is certainly not dispositive.107 In any event, the tests
are notoriously malleable, difficult, and fact-dependent, even when
dealing with what should be a fairly straightforward analysis.108
Many commentators had hoped that the wage and hour lawsuits
within platform companies that have been pending in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California would conclude,

102. See Stone, Legal Protections, supra note 101, at 257.
103. See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303
(5th Cir. 1998).
104. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most labor
and employment laws assume a paradigmatic relationship between an ‘employer’ and
‘employee.’ The employer in this model contracts directly with an individual employee to
perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer's actual or potential
supervision over the employee's method, manner, time and place of performance. This model
describes most workers well enough, but there has always been a large pool of workers in
alternative relationships with recipients of services. Some workers are ‘independent
contractors’ who contract to perform specific tasks or achieve particular results, but who retain
independence and self-management over their performance.”).
105. Stone, Legal Protections, supra note 101, at 257-58.
106. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 354 n.327 (2001).
107. Id. at 299-300.
108. Id. at 298 (“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law encourages ambiguity.
On the one hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment
relationship. On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are
plausibly not employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable ‘non-employee’
classification. It is not uncommon to find employees and putative contractors sitting side by
side, performing the same work without any immediately visible distinguishing characteristics.
And the trend of the working world is toward greater complexity and variation, driven partly
by the temptation to capitalize on the fog that obscures the essence of many working
relationships.”).
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or at least shape, these disputes over worker classification.109 In the
largest of these suits, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,110 over
160,000 drivers for the popular ridesharing service were certified as a
class to seek employee status and redress, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), for minimum wages and overtime pay.111
Throughout the litigation, the judges in the Northern District of
California struggled to characterize these working relationships within
the “on/off” toggle of employee status.112 The case was settled.113
1.

Litigation in the United States

In the United States, recent cases have planted the seeds for
inconsistent holdings about the status of gig economy workers. For
example, two federal trial courts reached opposing conclusions about
employment status despite the cases involving the same company, the
same platform business model, and the same way of structuring the
work relationship. In Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia allowed a case
involving respondeat superior liability of Uber to move forward.114 In
that case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been stabbed by an Uber
driver who had been behaving erratically.115 In responding to Uber’s
motion to dismiss the case, the court noted its skepticism about Uber’s
claim that its workers were all independent contractors, thus absolving
it of liability for wrongs that were committed in the furtherance of
Uber’s business.116 In about the same time period, the United States
109. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 584-85.
110. 311 F.R.D. 547, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
111. Id. at 550-51.
112. Again, this has been a longstanding problem. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employment
Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (“The new
ways of working, that I believe challenge normal legal analyses, include such new relations of
employment as temporary employment placed by an agency and part-time employment
rendered by people who have no other employer but are treated as contingent workers without
benefits or implicit promises. They also include ways of working that are not, technically,
‘employment’ relations under any statute: independent contractors, free-lancers, consultants,
and people out of the labor market after downsizing or other elimination of former career
jobs.”).
113

UBER CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, https://www.uberlitigation.com/ (last
updated Oct. 21, 2019).
116

114. 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 234, 238 (D.D.C. 2015).
115. Id. at 227.

Memorandum Opinion at 14, Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., (No. 15-257
(JEB)) (“In sum, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that [the driver]
was an independent contractor.”).
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Razak
v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a decision under the FLSA minimum wage
and hour law.117 Looking primarily at the control test, the court decided
that because the Uber drivers could work as much or as little as they
wanted, they looked more like independent contractors.118 The court
also discussed entrepreneurial activities and that Uber drivers
shouldered the risk of profit or loss, which also made them look more
like independent contractors.119
Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court handed down the
decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court.120 While
not an on-demand economy case, the California decision
fundamentally changed the test for determining employee status
throughout the state.121 In Dynamex, the court established the so-called
ABC test, which states that a business wanting to classify workers as
independent contractors must satisfy three elements:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for
the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs
work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and
(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work
performed for the hiring entity.122

While all of these seem difficult for Uber to meet, probably the most
difficult and fatal element for Uber—and companies like it—will be
prong B. To date, Uber has had little luck convincing courts that it is a
software company.123 Courts have recognized that Uber is in the
business of providing transportation, and that drivers are an integral
part of shuttling passengers from one location to another.124 While the
matter may be indeterminate now, under the new expansive ABC test
117. No. CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018).
118. Id. at *16.
119. Id. at *17.
120. 416 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2018).
121. Noam Scheiber, Gig Economy Business Model Dealt a Blow in California Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/04/30/business/economy/gig-economyruling.html.
122. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 7.
123. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Uber
is no more a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’ because it
uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a ‘technology company’ because it uses
computers and robots to manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a ‘technology
company’ because it uses modern irrigation techniques to grow its sugar cane.”).
124. See Razak, 2018 WL 1744467, at *3.
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in California, the most likely outcome will be that Uber drivers are
employees. Indeed, in Bill AB-5, the California legislature codified the
ABC test, solidifying the Dynamex decision into statute.125
2.

Litigation Within the European Union

The gig economy model only gained momentum later in the
European Union, and as such, the litigation about employee status was
a few years behind the United States.126 However, EU jurisdictions are
now grappling with the same set of difficult problems around employee
misclassification that the U.S. courts have been struggling with for
several years. A 2018 blog post by Valerio De Stefano discussed the gig
economy litigations across Europe and the reasoning of the courts
deciding the cases, which are being decided inconsistently.127 This
initial round of litigation has resulted in uncertainty and confusion.
Some tribunals have found gig workers to be employees and others
have found them to be independent contractors.128 Making matters
more complicated is that some EU jurisdictions have a third category
of “dependent contractor” or “self-employed worker,” which can make
classification lawsuits even more complicated.129
One of the first cases in Europe that received a great deal of
attention was Aslam v. Uber, in which the London Employment
Tribunal ruled that the Uber drivers bringing the case were “workers,”
an intermediate status between employee and independent
contractor.130 The Tribunal noted that Uber had imposed a great number
of conditions on the drivers, managed and instructed the drivers
through the cellphone app, and overall, controlled the drivers’ working
conditions.131 The United Kingdom’s Employment Appeals Tribunal

125. John Myers et al., Newsom Signs Bill Rewriting California Employment Law,
Limiting Use of Independent Contractors, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2019-09-18/gavin-newsom-signs-ab5-employees0independent-contractorscalifornia.
126. Compare Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 584-85
(listing American cases), with De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17 (listing European
cases).
127. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17; see also Ruiz, supra note 23 (listing
court cases across various jurisdictions).
128. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.
129. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 636 (comparing systems of worker classification
in Canada, Italy, Spain, and the United States).
130. [2016] EW Misc B68, [97] (ET) (28 Oct. 2016), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/
Misc/2016/B68.html.
131. Id. [92].
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upheld the decision on appeal.132 Courts in other European nations have
also held on-demand workers to be employees. In Belgium, the
Administrative Commission for the Governance of the Employment
Relationship decided that Deliveroo food-delivery bicycle riders were
employees under Belgian law.133 In its decision, the Commission noted
that Deliveroo riders do not control their working time, since they must
reserve their work slots more than one week in advance.134 In Spain,
the Labor Inspectorates of Valencia and Madrid determined that
Deliveroo and Glovo drivers were employees because they work in
conditions of subordination to the platform.135
Contrast these outcomes with the recent decision of the Labor
Tribunal of Turin, Italy, which rejected a claim from Foodora delivery
riders who sought employee classification.136 The Tribunal relied
heavily on the fact that the workers had control over their schedules
and could decide when they wanted to work.137 As such, the Tribunal
found that these riders were not employees.138 A similar argument
convinced the Paris Court of Appeal, which found that a Deliveroo
rider was not an employee, in part because the riders could choose their
shifts and decide when to work.139 The reasoning about work flexibility
132. Id. [106].
133. Commission Administrative de règlement de la relation de travail (CRT)
[Administrative Commission for the Settlement of Work Relationship] Feb. 23, 2018, No. 116FR-20180209 [hereinafter Commission Administrative (Belg.)], http://commissiearbeids
relaties.belgium.be/docs/dossier-116-fr.pdf, (Belg.); see also Les Coursiers Deliveroo Sont de
Faux Indépendant, Selon la CRT, TRENDS (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:58 AM), http://trends.levif.be/
economie/entreprises/les-coursiers-deliveroo-sont-de-faux-independant-selon-la-crt/articlenormal-817847.html? (describing the court’s decision).
134. Commission Administrative (Belg.), supra note 133, at 7.
135. S. Juz. Soc., June 1, 2018 (No. 244/2018), https://adriantodoli.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/documento-2.pdf (Spain); see also África Semprún & Javier Romera, La
Inspección de Trabajo Acorrala a Deliveroo y Glovo por los Falsos Autónomos,
ELECONOMISTA.ES (Feb. 5, 2018, 7:34 AM), http://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/
noticias/8914943/02/18/Trabajo-acorrala-a-Deliveroo-y-Glovo-por-los-falsos-autonomos.
html (describing labor inspections of “false autonomous” workers).
136. Vincenzo Di Gennaro & Attilio Pavone, Italian Labour Court Hands Down
Landmark Decision on Foodora Case with Potentially Far-Reaching Implications for Any
Company Active in Italy’s Growing Gig Economy, GLOBAL WORKPLACE INSIDER BLOG (May
24, 2018), https://www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/2018/05/italian-labour-court-hands-downlandmark-decision-on-foodora-case-with-potentially-far-reaching-implications-for-anycompany-active-in-italys-growing-gig-economy/; see also Avvocati Giuslavoristi Italiani,
Motivazioni Caso Foodora—La Sintesi, LINKEDIN (May 7, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/motivazioni-caso-foodora-la-sintesi-agi/ (describing the court’s decision).
137. Gennaro & Pavone, supra note 136.
138. Avvocati Giuslavoristi Italiani, supra note 136.
139. Cour d’appel de Paris [CA] [Paris Court of Appeal], Paris, Chambre 2, Nov. 9,
2017, 16/12875 (Fr.); see also La Justice Déboute un Livreur de Deliveroo qui Voulait Être
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and selection of shifts also convinced the Paris Conseil des
Prud’hommes, a lower judicial body in France, which held that an Uber
driver was not an employee.140 Ultimately, these precedents illustrate
different approaches to dealing with national law and the classification
of on-demand workers. As these cases wend their way through
employment tribunals and national courts, the differing outcomes and
confusing conclusions will only multiply.
IV. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PLATFORM
ECONOMY: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE JURISDICTIONS
“[I]t only takes two facing mirrors to construct a labyrinth.”
—Jorge Luis Borges141

To date, the cases about employment in the gig economy have not
delved into the issues surrounding jurisdiction, choice of law, and
conflict of law in any depth.142 In part, that is because there has not yet
been enough law developed to enable the parties to make strategic
decisions about where to bring suit, or to ask courts to apply a particular
jurisdiction’s law. Without knowing how any particular jurisdiction
will rule, the parties can only guess about which legal system might
result in a favorable ruling. Some jurisdictions generally have more
favorable labor and employment laws, or have precedents that strongly
favor employee rather than independent contractor status, which might
influence a decision about where a plaintiff might want to bring suit.143
Reconnu Salarié, L’EXPRESS L’ENTERPRISE (Nov. 17, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://lentreprise.
lexpress.fr/rh-management/droit-travail/la-justice-deboute-un-livreur-de-deliveroo-qui-voulaitetre-reconnu-salarie_1961503.html (describing the court’s decision).
140. Conseil de Prud’hommes de Paris [CP] [Paris Labor Court], Paris, Jan. 29, 2018,
No. RG:F 16/11460; see also Clément Bohic, Les Chauffeurs Uber Salariés: C’est Non Pour
les Prud’hommes, ITESPRESSO (Feb. 9, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.itespresso.fr/chauffeursuber-salaries-non-prud-hommes-183124.html (describing the court’s decision).
141. JORGE LUIS BORGES, Nightmares, in SEVEN NIGHTS 33 (Eliot Weinberger trans.,
Faber & Faber 1984) (“I remember seeing, in the house of Dora de Alvear in the Belgrano
district, a circular room whose walls and doors were mirrored, so that whoever entered the
room found himself at the center of a truly infinite labyrinth.”).
142. The litigations so far have treated the employee status question as one of national
or state law. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547, 547 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Yuki Noguchi, Gig
Economy Renews Debate over Whether Contractors Are Really Employees, NPR (Mar. 7,
2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/07/589840595/gig-economy-renews-debateover-whether-contractors-are-really-workers (discussing how freelancers and contract workers
do not have access to traditional benefits).
143. See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1061 (noting that the plaintiffs contended that
California’s laws are more worker-protective than those of other states); Kia Kokalitcheva,
Judge to Lawyer Suing Uber: Stop Filing in California, FORTUNE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://
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In addition, apart from the Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc. case, most of the
litigation to date has concerned platforms that facilitate work in the real
world, i.e., transportation, home repair, cleaning, or odd jobs.144 As
such, the workers have tended to bring suit based on where they live
and perform their work.145
This is the not the case with the three examples that were set out
in the Introduction. Upwork could be sued in many of the jurisdictions
in which it has recruited requesters and workers. Calculating the
permutations of the different countries involved in this interaction is
practically a matter of factorial combinatorics.146 TaskRabbit platform
workers in the United Kingdom, who work for a platform based in the
United States but owned by a Swedish company, might have a very
difficult time figuring out what their minimum wage would be. Sweden
has no minimum wage.147 What about the workers in refugee camps
performing piecework computer tasks for a multinational company
with a platform based in yet another country and end users in many
nations? This is an incredibly difficult problem.
These difficult issues will soon become important in future
litigation and policy discussions. Conflicts of law is a “sleeper,”148 a
dormant and unexpected legal issue for the gig economy now, that will
have considerable significance in the future. In the three- to five-year
period following the publication of this Article, there will be indicators
or rough outlines of different national approaches to the labor and
employment law problems the gig economy has provoked. In some
instances, the response will be the work of courts, either stretching
current laws to cover the gig economy, or declining to do so on the
fortune.com/2015/10/14/labor-lawyer-california-license (stating that the judge informed
prominent plaintiffs’ attorney Shannon Liss-Riordan that she wasn’t eligible for admission pro
hac vice in California because she “regularly engaged in substantial legal activities in
California.”).
144. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 584-85. But see No.
12-cv-05524-JST, 2016 WL 304747, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (considering a platform that
facilitates online work, such as verifying business listings).
145. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (stating that the plaintiffs are Pennsylvania drivers who filed the lawsuit in
Pennsylvania).
146. Cf. Brett Berry, Combinations vs Permutations, MEDIUM (June 14, 2017), https://
medium.com/i-math/combinations-permutations-fa7ac680f0ac (explaining how to calculate
combinations and permutations).
147. Per Skedinger, Sweden: A Minimum Wage Model in Need of Modification? 1 (Res.
Inst. of Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 774, 2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.493.6418&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
148. Sleeper, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sleeper
(last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
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grounds that it is beyond the bounds of existing regulation. In the
ensuing years, the issues will make their way up to the appellate courts.
In other instances, legislatures will be key actors, either passing laws to
provide courts with clear guidance as to appropriate approaches or to
correct approaches where legislatures disagree with the courts.
Legislatures may enact “fixes” to bring gig workers within the ambit
of existing laws, to repeal the effect of judicial decisions they do not
like, or to pass legislation specifically to regulate the gig economy.
Based on the preliminary rulings we have seen, a high degree of
divergence is likely in various national final rulings.149 Because the
decision about classification is like “being ‘handed a square peg and
[being] asked to choose between two round holes,’” some jurisdictions
will decide that gig workers are employees, and some will decide that
they are independent contractors.150 Where a legal system recognizes
an intermediate category, that third category is also a permissible
choice.151 It is at that point that the conflicts-of-law problems will
emerge. In selecting a place to bring suit, workers will try to choose the
jurisdiction with the highest or most favorable labor standards.
Likewise, platforms could also attempt to choose a favorable forum,
either by writing clauses into their online terms or by arguing for
removal.152 Choosing regulation by searching for the jurisdiction that
provides either a “race to the bottom” or “race to the top” seems more
like a jurisdictional shell game than a coherent regulatory approach.
While so far this Article has been somewhat abstract in its
discussion of the conflict-of-law and choice-of-law rules, the following
discussion is designed to cover three jurisdictions that have important
connections with crowdwork: California, the European Union, and
India. These issues are described only in brief. While the application to
crowdwork platforms has not occurred yet, the analysis below is
intended as a starting point.
A.

United States: California’s Governmental Interest Approach

An analysis of California law is included because many of the
well-known on-demand platforms originated in Silicon Valley and

149. See De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.
150. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 681 (quoting Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d
1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015)); see De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.
151. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 637.
152. See BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 22-23.
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many platforms continue to operate there.153 Further, many platforms
were tested in the San Francisco Bay area, and so California is home to
many requesters and on-demand workers as well.154 The focus here is
on California and not the entire United States because conflict-of-law
rules vary between the states.155 The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Laws has only been adopted by roughly twenty states; some states
continue to follow the Restatement (First), while others take a common
law approach.156 This problem with lack of uniformity can be
sidestepped by focusing on the conflicts laws of California.
The focus on California also makes sense as many gig economy
cases have been brought in California, although most of those cases
have either settled or are in the process of settling.157 Currently, there is
no consensus in California law about whether platform workers are
employees or independent contractors.158 As noted in Part III, the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Dynamex sets out the ABC test,
which contains a strong presumption in favor of employment status.159
With this change in the controlling precedent, it is safe to assume that
under California law, a substantial fraction of on-demand workers will
be found to be employees. From a worker’s perspective, California is
also a jurisdiction within the United States that has some of the more
worker-friendly sets of labor and employment laws. For example,
noncompetition clauses are not enforceable in California, unlike their
status in most other states.160 As another example, California’s Unruh
Act extends antidiscrimination protection to LGBT workers, whereas
the federal law has not yet done so.161 As a third example, California is
also phasing in a state minimum wage that is higher than the amount
153. Tracey Lien, On-Demand Business Models Have Put Some Startups on Life
Support, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/
la-fi-tn-end-of-on-demand-snap-story.html.
154. Id.
155. See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 72 (5th ed. 2010).
156. Id.
157. See Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy: Settlements Leave Labor Issues Unsettled,
LAW360 (May 5, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/791341/gig-economysettlements-leave-labor-issues-unsettled.
158. Lydia DePillis, California Ruling Puts Pressure on Uber, Lyft and Other Gig
Economy Employers, CNN MONEY (May 3, 2018, 1:22 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/
05/01/news/economy/california-gig-employer-ruling/index.html.
159. 416 P.3d 1, 29, 30, 35 (Cal. 2018).
160. Glynn, supra note 50; Lester & Ryan, supra note 50; Moffat, supra note 50, at
941-43.
161. See CAL. DEP’T FAIR EMP’T & HOUS., DFEH-U01P-ENG, UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT (Apr. 2019), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2017/12/DFEH_Unruh
FactSheet.pdf.
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under the FLSA, with the ultimate goal of a $15 hourly wage by
2023.162
1.

Conflict of Laws: Governmental Interest Approach

California courts apply the governmental interest approach and
comparative impairment analysis when resolving conflict-of-laws
issues.163 The governmental interest approach involves three steps.
First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the
potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in
question is the same or different.164 Second, if there is a difference, the
court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own
law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether
a “true conflict” exists.165 Third, if the court finds a true conflict, it
carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of each
jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law “to determine
which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were
subordinated to the policy of the other state” and then ultimately applies
“the law of the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its
law were not applied.”166 This last step is a comparative impairment
analysis.167
Two recent cases concerning conflicts of employment law are
illustrative of the approach and provide some guidance for application
of the tests to crowdwork. In Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,
162. Labor Comm’rs Office, Minimum Wage, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. REL. (Dec. 2016),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm.
163. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (citing
Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967)). For an excellent summary of choice-of-law and
conflict-of-law rules in California, see Michael H. Hoffheimer, California’s Territorial Turn
in Choice of Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 167 (2015).
164. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922. The California government interest approach owes a
heavy debt to the judicial opinions of California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor. See
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 629-89 (1963). See generally
Herma Hill Kay, Chief Justice Traynor and Choice of Law Theory, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 747
(1984) (recognizing Justice Traynor’s contributions to the field).
165. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922; see also WILLIAM LINDSLEY, 12 CAL. JUR. 3D § 30,
Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (“Although the two potentially concerned states have
different laws, when only one of two states related to a case has a legitimate interest in the
application of its law and policy and the other has none, the law of the interested state should
be applied. A true conflict of laws arises only if the laws of the two jurisdictions differ and each
state has a legitimate interest in having its law applied.”); Harold W. Horowitz, The Law of
Choice of Law in California—A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719, 743-47 (1974)
(explaining “false-false conflicts”).
166. Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976).
167. Id.
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the court held that the privacy laws of California and Georgia differed,
conflicted, and the failure to apply California’s privacy law would have
impaired California’s interest more severely than the application of
California law would have impaired Georgia’s interests.168 In Kearney,
the Atlanta-based branch of Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) recorded the
telephone conversations between SSB’s employees and California
clients without the California clients’ knowledge or consent.169 Under
California’s invasion of privacy statute, all parties must have
knowledge and consent to the recording of a telephone conversation.170
However, under Georgia’s privacy statute, only one party in the
conversation needs to give prior consent to the recording of the
telephone conversation.171 The court reasoned that both California and
Georgia had a legitimate interest in the application of its law.172
California had an interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens.
Georgia’s privacy statute can be reasonably interpreted to establish the
ground rules under which persons in Georgia may act in regards to
recording private conversations and therefore seeks to protect the
liability of persons or businesses who acted in reasonable reliance on
Georgia law.173
Accordingly, the court concluded that the case presented a true
conflict.174 After a true conflict is identified by the court, the
comparative impairment approach seeks to determine which state’s
interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the
policy of the other state.175 However, the comparative impairment
approach is not a weighing test because a “balancing” of conflicting
state policies creates federalism concerns.176 Instead, the comparative
impairment process attempts to accommodate conflicting state policies
and achieve the “maximum attainment” of underlying governmental

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

137 P.3d at 917.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id.; see JOHN K. DIMUGNO & PAUL E.B. GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW
HANDBOOK § 17:2, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019). True conflicts differ from “false
conflicts.” Brainerd Currie termed a “false conflict” as “a situation in which only one state had
an actual interest in having its law applied.” DIMUGNO & GLAD, supra.
175. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 933 (citing Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723
(Cal. 1976).
176. Id. at 934 (citing Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 723).
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purpose.177 The Kearney court looked to the legislative history of the
invasion of privacy statute’s enactment to determine the statute’s
principle purpose.178 Since 1967, the California legislature has
continually modified and added to the invasion of privacy statutory
scheme.179 Additionally, the California courts have repeatedly invoked
and vigorously enforced the invasion of privacy provisions.180
Accounting for the many national and international firms that have
headquarters, offices, or telephone operators in California, the Kearney
court reasoned that the failure to enforce California’s invasion of
privacy provision would substantially undermine the protection
afforded by the statute.181 By contrast, applying California law to a
Georgia business’s recording of telephone calls between its employees
and California customers will not severely impair Georgia’s interests
because California law does not totally prohibit a party to a telephone
call from recording the call but rather prohibits only the undisclosed
recording of telephone conversations.182 Accordingly, the court held
that “California law should apply in determining whether the alleged
secret recording of telephone conversations at issue in this case
constitutes an unlawful invasion of privacy” because California’s
interests would be severely impaired if its law were not applied, and
Georgia’s interest would not be significantly impaired if California law
rather than Georgia law were applied.183
In Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., the Court held that the California
Labor Code applied to overtime work performed in California for a
California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs.184 In Sullivan,
former non-California resident employees sued Oracle alleging
misclassification as “exempt” from overtime and sought unpaid

177. Id. (quoting Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 728 (Cal. 1978));
see also Note, Comparative Impairment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the Conflict
of Laws, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1982) (“The spirit of our Constitution and the values
underlying our federal system sanction and encourage the separate development of policy and
law in each state in accordance with its own environment. If this uniquely federalist value—
maximum attainment of policy objectives by each state—is itself a systemic policy whose
promotion is important to each state, the comparative impairment principle follows quite
naturally.”).
178. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 934.
179. Id. at 935.
180. Id. at 934.
181. Id. at 936.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 937.
184. 254 P.3d 237, 247 (Cal. 2011).
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overtime compensation.185 The employees contended California’s
overtime law governed their work in the state of California, whereas
Oracle contended the laws of the plaintiffs’ home states, Colorado and
Arizona, governed.186 The relevant laws differed between the three
states because California law had an additional overtime compensation
provision increasing the rate of pay to twice the regular rate, for work
in excess of eight hours, on the seventh workday.187 Unlike California
law, neither Colorado law nor Arizona law required double pay.188
The California Supreme Court reasoned that neither Colorado nor
Arizona expressed any “interest in disabling their residents from
receiving the full protection of California overtime law when working
[in California], or in requiring their residents to work side-by-side with
California residents in California for lower pay.”189 “Consequently,
neither Colorado nor Arizona ha[d] a legitimate interest in shielding
Oracle from the requirements of California wage law as to work
performed [in California]” because Oracle is a multistate operation.190
“[A] company that conducts business in numerous states ordinarily is
required to make itself aware of and comply with the law of a state in
which it chooses to do business.”191 Even if a genuine “true conflict”
existed, permitting nonresidents to work in California without the
protection of California’s overtime law would have sacrificed “the
state’s important public policy goals of protecting health and safety and
preventing the evils associated with overwork.”192 “Colorado overtime
law expressly d[id] not apply outside the state’s boundaries, and
Arizona ha[d] no overtime law.”193 In this situation, the California
Supreme Court held that the California Labor Code applied to overtime
work performed in California for a California-based employer by outof-state plaintiffs.194
One last point about why Sullivan is an important case. In the last
part of its opinion, the court declined to extend California overtime pay
provisions to work performed by the plaintiffs for Oracle in states other
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
2006)).
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 239.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. (quoting Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 920 (Cal.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
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than California. The discussion is limited to the last section of the
opinion, and it is fact-specific, noting that the plaintiffs were trying to
reinstate time-barred FLSA claims as restitution claims under
California’s unfair competition law.195 Nonetheless, the court noted the
presumption against extraterritorial application of laws, and noted no
intent to overcome that presumption in the Unfair Competition Law
(UCL) by the California legislature.196 This was enough to prompt one
commentator to note that this decision and ones like it marked a return
of California to territorial application of rules, with a tendency to apply
“the law of the place where the events occurred” rather than apply the
governmental interest approach.197
2.

Choice of Law

In addition to the default rules of the governmental interest
approach and the comparative impairment test set out above, California
follows the rules set out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Laws.198 “[W]hen the parties intend the law of a certain state to govern
a dispute, that intention is usually respected. . . . In the absence of
countervailing public policy considerations, agreements of the parties
as to the applicable law are enforced.”199 However, an escape clause
qualified this statement. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
states as follows:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, . . . unless . . . application of the law of
the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue . . . .200

In determining which state has a “materially greater interest” in the
resolution of an issue,
court[s] may consider (1) the place of contracting, (2) the place of
negotiation of the contract, (3) the place of performance, (4) the location
of the subject matter of the contract, (5) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Hoffheimer, supra note 163, at 241-42.
See id. at 168 n.4.
Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Techs., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 92 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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(6) the impact of the transaction on the state or its citizens, and (7) the
extent to which the state has sought to regulate the issue.201

Three cases are particularly relevant for the crowdwork
discussion. In Hammerl v. Acer Europe, S.A., the plaintiff’s
employment contract contained a choice-of-law clause.202 The plaintiff
sought to bring his claim under the California Labor Code whereas the
defendant, Acer Europe, sought to enforce the contractual choice-oflaw provision and have Swiss law govern the dispute.203 The court
stated that the defendant’s American subsidiary corporation, Acer
America, exercised a degree of control over the plaintiff’s employment
duties, compensation, and benefits to the extent that it would be
reasonable to consider the plaintiff an employee of Acer America and,
therefore, eligible to state a claim for violations of the California Labor
Code.204
In Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., the court
declined to enforce the parties’ contractual choice-of-law provision
because the interests of the forum state, California, were “materially
greater” than those of the chosen state, Maryland.205 In this case, a
Maryland corporation sought to enforce a noncompetition covenant
within a consultant’s contract after a California corporation recruited
and hired the consultant.206 The court was convinced that “California
ha[d] a materially greater interest than d[id] Maryland in the
application of its law to the parties’ dispute, and that California’s
interests would be more seriously impaired if its policy were
subordinated to the policy of Maryland” because California had
consistently expressed a public policy “ensur[ing] that every citizen
shall retain the right to pursue any lawful employment and enterprise
of their choice.”207 The case of In re Gault South Bay Litigation, which
involved an Indiana corporation’s attempt to enforce a noncompetition
clause, had a similar impact.208 The conflicts-of-law analysis required

201. In re Gault S. Bay Litig., No. C 07-04659 JW, 2008 WL 4065843, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187, 188).
202. No. C 08-4754 JF (RS), 2009 WL 30130, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
203. Id. at *3.
204. Id. at *7.
205. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
206. Id. at 75-76.
207. Id. at 85-86 (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
208. No. C 07-04659 JW, 2008 WL 4065843, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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the court to apply California law to the agreement, holding the noncompete provision of the agreement to be void.209
Finally, Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. involved a
contractual mandatory arbitration provision within an employment
agreement.210 The plaintiffs alleged various wage and hour violations
under the California Labor Code.211 The employer, a Texas-based
corporation, sought to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision
under Texas law whereas the plaintiffs sought to argue
unconscionability using California public policy.212 The court held the
California law enforceable because enforcing Texas law would be
contrary to the “fundamental policy” of California’s interest to protect
California-based workers.213 These cases seem to indicate that rather
than accepting a choice-of-law clause written by an employer at face
value, California courts are willing to undertake a more searching
review, looking at the governmental and public policy interests
involved.
B

European Union

The European Union is included in this study because of its large
number of requesters and workers performing gig work, as well as a
substantial number of platforms that are either hosted or EU-owned.214
In addition, European countries have had a long history of dealing with
cross-border workers and posted workers.215 As background to this
discussion, it is important to note that a number of issues, such as
worker safety, maximum hours, or employment discrimination are in
many nations in the European Union considered “public law,” enforced
by a national governmental authority.216 Each such authority is
responsible for either taking action (or not) to enforce the rules within
its territorial boundaries.217
209. Id. at *5.
210. 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 171.
213. Id. at 185.
214. Cf. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17 (noting litigation involving
crowdworking platforms in the European Union).
215. See generally Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of
Services, 1997 O.J. (L 18) (dealing with posted workers).
216. See Franzen, supra note 43, at 245.
217. Id. at 246-47 (“As a rule—this is universally accepted—the application of these
protective norms is contingent on the fact that the work is executed within national boundaries.
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Some components of the employment relationship, however, are
considered a subset of contractual matters, and these are classified as
private law.218 As such, these matters are generally left up to the
individual employee to claim his or her rights through grievance
procedures or the courts.219 The rules of jurisdiction over such claims
are set out in the Brussels I regulation. Section 5 of the Brussels I
Regulation allows employees who act as claimants to commence
proceedings in a number of places: in the courts of the employer’s
domicile, in the courts of the habitual place of work, and in the courts
of the engaging place of business.220 As such, Brussels I is quite
permissive in where an employee can bring a claim, with the ultimate
intent of furthering employee protection.221
Private international law problems are set out in the Rome I
Regulation,222 in which the European Union adopted an extremely
comprehensive and sophisticated system for dealing with private
international law problems and labor and employment.223 Based on the
Rome Convention of 1980,224 the Rome I Regulation has as its goal a
uniform approach that will yield predictable outcomes throughout the
member states.225 There is also a special section, article 8, specifically
The Conflict of Law norm is unilateral. For example, the German factory inspectorate . . . is
only responsible and German safety regulations only apply if the work is done in Germany.”).
Collective norms pertaining to industrial relations do not easily fit into the public law/private
law dichotomy. Id. at 246.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC). The regulation also
allows for a dispute arising out of an employer’s branch or agency to take place in the courts
in those places, and on a counterclaim, the court in which the original claim is pending. Id.
221. See Grušić, supra note 51 (noting that even though Brussels I jurisdictional rules
were enacted to protect workers, recent decisions had not been employee friendly).
222. Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC). For more on the history
of the enactment of Rome I, see Franzen, supra note 43, at 247.
223. See, e.g., MIRIAM KULLMANN, ENFORCEMENT OF LABOUR LAW IN CROSS-BORDER
SITUATIONS: A LEGAL STUDY OF THE EU’S INFLUENCE ON THE DUTCH, GERMAN, AND SWEDISH
ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS 4 (Sebastian Kortmann & Dennis Faber eds., 2015) (discussing
enforcement issues that arise around posted workers in Germany, the Netherlands, and
Sweden); Sebastian Krebber, Conflict of Laws in Employment in Europe, 21 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 501, 503 (2000).
224. The 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations is the
predecessor law. Before the Rome Convention, traditional approaches to continental European
private international law of contracts had as their object finding the “seat” of the dispute. See
generally FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE
LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME (2d. ed. 1880) (nineteenth-century
treatise on conflict of laws). For tort law, private international law is set out in the Rome II
Regulation. Council Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC).
225. Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC).
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dealing with employment contracts.226 Rome I attempts to respect the
parties’ choice of the applicable law in their contracts, reinforce
predictability and stability, and allow some discretion to default rules
to favor the nation with the closest connection to the contract to supply
the rules.227
1.

Problems with Characterization

In his book chapter, Professor Wolfgang Kozak sets out some
thoughts as to how the private international law issues created by
crowdwork might be treated in the European Union.228 Most of
Kozak’s discussion, however, focuses on the preliminary question of
how to characterize the relationship between the worker and the
platform.229 So, if there is an employment contract, then you would use
article 8 to analyze the problem. If, on the other hand, the contract
between the worker and the platform is not an employment contract,
then it would receive the analysis specified for general contracts in
article 4. The problem that gives Kozak a great deal of trouble is that if
EU national systems are using different standards to decide if gig
workers have employment contracts, there is no way to determine
which article of the Rome Regulation to apply.230 The problem that
Kozak ran into was, in effect, a type of difficult question of
characterization.231 The Rome Regulation requires a determination
about whether there is an employment contract, but such a
determination of characterization232 is the very issue that is the conflict

226. Id. art. 8, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC).
227. VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 203.
228. Wolfgang Kozak, Crowdwork mit Auslandsbezug: Anwendbares Recht und
Gerichsstände, in ARBEIT IN DER GIG-ECONOMY 305-19 (Doris Lutz & Martin Risak eds.,
2017) (Austria).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 6-7. Perhaps it is not an exact match but the issue
could also be viewed as analogous to the limited doctrine of vorfrage (a German doctrine that
roughly translates into English as “preliminary question”). The entire scenario provides a very
difficult thought problem. Cf. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Garden of Forking Paths, in
LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES & OTHER WRITINGS 19, 25 (Donald A. Yates trans., Donald
A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., 1964) (1958) (“Before unearthing this letter, I had questioned
myself about the ways in which a book can be infinite. I could think of nothing other than a
cyclic volume, a circular one. A book whose last page was identical with the first, a book which
had the possibility of continuing indefinitely.”).
232. Professor Louise Merrett describes the question of whether there is an employment
contract as one of characterization. See MERRETT, supra note 26, at 49.
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between the different legal systems.233 In essence, Kozak spends his
chapter describing this very difficult problem of characterization and
notes the questions it raises.
The analysis need not stop there, however. Kozak was correct to
raise the issue of characterization, but that does not present an
insurmountable bar to the analysis. Other parts of the Rome Regulation
itself describe what to do in these types of infinite regress problems.
For example, article 10 attempts to correct the characterization problem
that comes up with contractual validity, noting that courts should decide
the validity of a contract based on the law that would govern if it were
found to be valid.234 Rather than get bogged down in this difficult
characterization problem, the answer lies in setting out the alternatives
and following them to their conclusions. What law would a worker
suing a platform receive if they attempted to bring the case under article
8, and alternately, what would the result be if they attempted to bring
the case under article 4? The next subparts explore these two paths.
2.

Two Paths of the Rome Convention

Let us assume that the correct determination is to treat platform
work as a contract of employment, and further let us assume that no
choice of law has been set forth in the contract. In that instance, Rome
I article 8 states, “[T]he contract shall be governed by the law of the
country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually
carries out his work in performance of the contract.”235 Thus a
geographical location, that is, the habitual place of work, has
considerable importance and gravity in making the determination of
applicable law.236 Article 8 goes on to state that, when the habitual place
of work cannot be determined, “the contract shall be governed by the
law of the country where the place of business through which the
employee was engaged is situated.”237 An escape clause is also
included, and if it appears from the totality of the circumstances that

233. As discussed by Professor Geert van Calster, a vorfrage concern may arise when
EU law may have “determined which applicable law is connected to a given legal category,
however before one may apply it, one needs to decide on the actual existence of the category
in the facts at issue.” VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 6.
234. Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 10(1), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC).
235. Id. art. 8(2), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC).
236. VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 216. The habitual place of employment would not
be changed by temporary employment. Id.
237. Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 8(3), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC).
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the contract is more related with another country than those enumerated
in the preceding sections, then the law of the other country will apply.238
If on the other hand, we say that the user and the platform have
not entered a contract for employment, and we instead have a general
contract, then the correct place to look is Rome I article 4(1). Under
this section, “a contract for the provision of services shall be governed
by the law of the country where the service provider has his habitual
residence.”239 In case this is not a proper classification, then article 4(2)
states that the contract shall be governed “by the law of the country
where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the
contract has his habitual residence.”240 Escape clauses also apply here,
with Rome I article 4(3) and 4(4) noting that if it seems that the contract
is more closely connected with another country then that country’s laws
will apply.241
While it is true that habitual place of work might not be different
than the worker’s place of residence, since most platform workers
choose to work from their homes, this might be a distinction without a
difference. In any event, it should not lead to an infinite regress problem
as both article 4 and article 6 contain sufficient escape clauses that lead
back to the idea of applying the country’s law that has the most
connection to contract or the contract of employment, whichever we
determine it to be. A larger impact might be felt because of specialized
rules for employment contracts and choice of law, the rules for which
are set out in the next subpart.
3.

Choice of Law

Just as in the United States, many employment contracts in the
European Union contain a choice-of-law clause, so as to minimize
transaction costs.242 These clauses can provide certainty, especially
when a transaction has an international aspect.243 Pursuant to Rome I
article 3, parties are free to specify in their contract the law that they
would elect to apply to a dispute arising from the contract.244 The
238. Id.
239. Id. art. 4(1)(b), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 11 (EC).
240. Id. art. 4(2), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 11 (EC).
241. Id. art. 4(3-4), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 11 (EC).
242. Eric A. Posner, The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The
Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 261,
261-62 (2013).
243. Id.
244. Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 10-11 (EC).
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freedom of choice embraced by article 3 is expansive, even including
the ability to choose the law of a country that is not part of the European
Union.245 However, there is a countervailing concern, which is that the
employer will forum-shop and through a choice-of-law clause, seek to
dictate the choice of law unilaterally.246 Employees are recognized to
have less bargaining power, and the concern is that choice-of-law
provisions might work to their disadvantage.247 Therefore, the Rome
Regulation instead seeks to set a “minimum standard of employment
protection that cannot be undermined by the chosen law.”248
The Rome Regulation does this first by allowing the parties a
choice of law in their contract under article 3.249 Then, in article 8, we
are told that “[s]uch a choice of law may not, however, have the result
of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by
provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law
that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable.”250 In short,
the choice-of-law rules allow some flexibility, but not at the expense of
worker rights. As noted by Franzen,
[T]he idea of the principle of the most favourable law has achieved a
breakthrough. Its purpose is to prevent abuse of the party autonomy as
well as to allay misgivings about submitting the employment contract to
an unfamiliar or underdeveloped local law. This theory involves the joint
application of both legal systems. The employee is entitled to claim the
norm more favourable to him.251

C.

India and Private International Law

This Article includes a summary of the Indian system for private
international law because of the large numbers of Indian workers who
perform platform work.252 For decades now, many companies have
245. Id.
246. Case C-384/10, Jan Voogsgeerd v. Navimer S.A., 2011 E.C.R. I-13275; see also
HEPPLE, supra note 38 (“The reason for the application of mandatory employment rules is the
need to secure ‘protection for the party who from the socio-economic point of view is regarded
as the weaker in the contractual relationship.’” (quoting Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde,
Council Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, at 25,
1980 O.J. (C 282) (Oct. 31, 1980))).
247. Franzen, supra note 43, at 254 (“[T]he main idea is to protect the worker against
an abuse of power by the employer. This fear of abuse with regard to the freedom of contract
is enhanced with a growing distrust of large multinational enterprises (MNEs).”).
248. Krebber, supra note 223, at 527.
249. Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 10-11 (EC).
250. Id. art. 8(1), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC).
251. Franzen, supra note 43, at 259.
252. BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 29-32.
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outsourced their backroom operations and call centers to India and
other parts of the global south.253 India is an attractive location for many
businesses because there is a group of highly educated university
graduates to perform skilled work at lower cost.254 India is also an
attractive site to offshore because of its temporal advantage.255 While
workers in other parts of the world are asleep, call centers in India can
provide staffing to run round-the-clock technical support and customer
service hotlines.256 While in some ways the virtual work engaged in by
platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk seem new, in some ways they
are just another step along a system of global offshoring that has been
a trend over the past decades.257 While the labor and employment laws
on the books in India provide protections for workers, enforcement of
those laws on the ground continues to be a problem.258 A recent blog
post commented on the state of gig workers in India, which confirms
that as of the time of the writing of this Article, there had been no
determination about the employment status of Uber drivers.259
1.

The Approach of “Proper Law”

Until 1952, Indian courts followed the common law British rules
for private international law.260 After this date, courts in India were free
to establish an alternate set of rules for conflict-of-law problems, but as
a practical matter, the paucity of case law meant a continued reliance
on the law of the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the law of the
United States, Canada, and Australia.261 As a common law system, few
253. See Carolyn Penfold, Off-Shored Services Workers: Labour Law and Practice in
India, 19 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 91, 91-92 (2009).
254. Id. at 92 (noting that India has the advantage of a “large, well-educated, Englishspeaking work force”); see also Dev Nathan et al., Labour Practices in India 13-15 (ILO, Asia
Pacific Working Paper Series, 2016) (noting increasing automation and degree requirements
among engineering staff).
255. See Winifred R. Poster, Who’s on the Line? Indian Call Center Agents Pose as
Americans for U.S.-Outsourced Firms, 46 INDUS. REL. 271, 274 (2007).
256. Id.
257. See generally OFFSHORING AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN REMOTE WORK (Jon C.
Messenger & Naj Ghosheh eds., 2010) (examining the development of global offshoring).
258. Penfold, supra note 253, at 95.
259. Sonam Srivastava & Kushagra Srivastava, The Gig Economy Calls for
Identification Within the Indian Labour Laws, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (July 4, 2019), https://
www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/07/gig-economy-calls-identification-withinindian-labour-laws?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook.
260. See Indian & Gen. Inv. Tr. Ltd. v. Raja of Khalikote, AIR 1952 (Cal.) 508 (India).
261. F.E. NORONHA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INDIA: ADEQUACY OF PRINCIPLES
IN COMPARISON WITH COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 7-10 (2010) (analyzing opinions
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codifications of the private international law rules exist, and instead the
bulk of principles have been set out in various judicial decisions,
largely drawing on U.K. precedents.262 There are efforts in India in
support of uniformity and unification, in the areas of insolvency, ecommerce, international banking and secured credit, and international
secured interests.263 To date, there are no specific scholarly works
looking just at employment contracts and private international law. As
such, one must look at the general rules for contracts and then
extrapolate the principles to employment and labor, which are a subset
of contracts.
Jurisdiction in the Indian courts is far-reaching and encompasses
situations where a company “actually and voluntarily . . . carries on
business, or personally works for gain.”264 The term “employee” is used
in several pieces of legislation in India but is defined in different ways.
For example, the 1948 Minimum Wages Act contains a circular
definition, holding that an employee is “in a scheduled employment in
respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed.”265 On the
other hand, under the Payment of Gratuity Act of 1972, employee
means “any person, other than an apprentice, employed on wages in
any establishment.”266
2.

India and Conflicts in Employment and Labor Law

For conflicts of law involving contracts, India applies the “proper
law” approach, a concept historically developed under U.K. law.267 The
of the Indian Supreme Court and listing the foreign precedents compiled and used therein,
which are overwhelming).
262. Y. Narasimha Rao & Ors. v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi & Anr., (1991) 2 SCR 821, 830
(India); see also K.B. AGRAWAL & VANDANA SINGH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INDIA
19 (2010) (“Presently, in Indian private international law, in some areas there is an absolute
dearth of rules . . . . Indian courts have largely relied on English precedents, unfortunately even
many years after Indian independence.”).
263. NORONHA, supra note 261, at 40-42. See generally SATISH CHANDRA, DOCUMENTS
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) (reproducing texts of conventions and international
treaties to which India is a party).
264. AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 229-30 (citing CODE CIV. PROC. § 20
(1908), https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2191?view-type=browse&sam-handle=12
3456789/1362 (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)); accord NORONHA, supra note 261, at 54-55 (citing
U.S. precedents on minimum contacts for jurisdiction).
265. CHANDRA KUMAR JOHRI, LABOUR LAW IN INDIA 62 (2012).
266. Id.
267. It seems that India has continued to follow the “proper law approach,” despite the
United Kingdom—as part of the European Union—following the rules for conflicts under the
Rome Regulation. Will this change again with Brexit, and what approach would India take in
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“proper law” approach means that a court will use the law that the
parties have expressly or impliedly chosen to govern their dispute.268 If
the parties haven’t chosen a source of law or none is implied to the
parties, then Indian courts will impute the law that has the “closest and
most intimate connection with the contract.”269 The judge then
approaches the question of the “proper law” from the perspective of the
“reasonable man,” asking how a just and reasonable person would view
the problem. Elements that an Indian court might consider would
include:
[T]he place where the contract was made, the form and object of the
contract, the place of performance, the place of residence or business of
the parties, reference to the courts having jurisdiction and such other links
. . . to determine the system of law with which the transaction has its
closest and most real connection.270

Even though the parties’ choice of law will generally be respected by
Indian courts, parties may not choose a foreign law to avoid the
application of Indian law. For example, Indian prohibition of
speculation in groundnut oil could not be circumvented through a
choice-of-law clause invoking foreign law.271
With reference to employment contracts, the starting point would
be to ascertain the intent of the parties as to their choice of law. If that
is not possible, or no intent can be ascribed, an Indian court would then
look at the law of the place with which the employment contract is most
closely connected.272 In the case of an employment contract,

the face of Brexit? This speculation is beyond the scope of this Article, and as such this Article
will analyze the jurisdiction according to the common law proper law approach.
268. See PARAS DIWAN, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: INDIAN AND ENGLISH 506-08
(3d ed. 1993); accord R.S. CHAVAN, INDIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1982) (“It
means that parties to the contract are free to stipulate their terms of contract and also free to lay
down the law by which their contract would be governed. The law by which the contract is
intended by the parties to be governed is called ‘the proper law of contract.’”).
269. Nat’l Thermal Power Corp. v. Singer Co. & Ors., (1992) 3 SCR 106, 109 (India);
Delhi Cloth & Gen. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Harnam Singh & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 590, 592 (India);
NORONHA, supra note 261, at 72 (“[T]he expression refers to the substantive principles of the
domestic law of the chosen system and not to its conflict of law[] rules.”).
270. NORONHA, supra note 261, at 74; see Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the
Ship or Vessel “Assunzione” v. Owners of the Ship or Vessel “Assunzione” [1953] 1 All ER
278 (Eng.); Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance & Gen. Mut. Life
Assurance Soc’y Ltd., (1938) AC 224 (SC) 227-28 (N.Z.).
271. Se. Oil v. Messrs. Gorakhram Gokalchand, (1962) 64 Bom LR 113 (India).
272. AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 105; see also Schinas v. Nemazie, AIR
1952 (Cal.) 859, 863-64 (describing the case of a seafarer, in which court noted its willingness
to first look at the law selected by the parties; and if there was no selection made, then to look
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commentators have noted that a choice-of-law clause shall not have the
result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded by the
mandatory rules of the law of the state that would be applicable in the
absence of a choice-of-law clause.273 In Indian labor and employment
law, employment status is determined based on the employer’s ability
to dismiss the employee.274 Realizing that there are few “truly” Indian
sources and that the U.K. law itself may be in a state of flux due to
Brexit, the following is a limited discussion of some of the issues that
might arise in litigation around Indian crowdwork.
D.

Application of Choice of Law

A common issue to California, the European Union, and India
(and, likely, many additional jurisdictions) is the use of choice-of-law
clauses in contracts to specify which country’s labor and employment
law will govern the relationship.275 But in all three systems, California,
the European Union, and India, these choice-of-law clauses, which as
a practical matter almost entirely are dictated by employers, will not be
considered absolute.276 California’s application of the governmental
interest test and precedent in the context of noncompetition agreements
in fact seems to take a dim view of clauses selecting another state’s law
when it results in fewer rights than the California Labor Code provides
for workers.277 The European Union’s Rome Regulation allows choiceof-law clauses, but not if it causes workers to lose the rights they would
have enjoyed in the absence of such a clause.278 India’s approach is
similarly in accord, holding that a choice-of-law clause would not be
valid if it caused workers to lose rights they would have had under the
default choice-of-law provisions.279
These are important points to keep in mind, because crowdwork
environments are largely intermediated by and through standardized
form contracts, the “terms and conditions” or “terms of service” put

at the place where the contract was made or was to be performed, and if uncertain, to look at
the lex fori).
273. AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 108.
274. Id.
275. See Hammerl v. Acer Europe, S.A., No. C 08-4754 JF (RS), 2009 WL 30130, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009); Posner, supra note 242.
276. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971);
AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 105; Krebber, supra note 223.
277. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
278. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
279. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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forth in order for a user to register an account.280 These terms and
conditions are displayed in an online format, sometimes with scrollable
texts. Some are presented in a format that requires the user to click “I
agree” before continuing to use the site or platform. Courts in the
United States have been reaching a consensus that the “click” signifies
an objective assent or agreement to the form terms.281 Other sets of
terms may be presented in a scattered way throughout the website or
platform. Known as “browsewrap,” these kinds of contracts require no
manifestation of assent and U.S. courts have been reluctant to enforce
them.282
In fact, the “terms of service raise many of the same kinds of
issues for online workers that terms of use and end user licensing
agreements (EULAs) have long raised for software [user]s.”283 The
2018 ILO study Digital Labor Platforms and the Future of Work notes
that many platforms come along with terms and conditions that are
largely unfriendly to workers.284 Many contain statements purporting
to govern employment status and others may contain arbitration or
choice-of-law clauses. Online workers may not even have seen the
terms, or they may be presented in a piecemeal fashion, or during
inopportune times.285 Even if the workers are able to access the terms
and conditions that may not help them. The terms and conditions are
often long and dense, with some running to over ten thousand words of
legalese.286 Needless to say, just like busy consumers, most gig workers
are trying to piece together a living and do not have the time to read all
the terms. Even if they did, a feature of online adhesion contracts is
their “take it or leave it” nature.287 Even if a worker did read the terms
and conditions fully, any attempt to bargain would likely be futile.288
The terms of service for many on-demand platforms “contain a
statement that the work is done on an ‘independent contractor’ basis
280. See BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 22-23.
281. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 840-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
282. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
283. BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 22 (citing Miriam A.
Cherry, A Eulogy for the EULA, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 336-37 (2014)).
284. BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 22-24.
285. Id. at 23.
286. Id.
287. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (describing problems of adhesion contracts).
288. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 55 (2013);
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1187 (1983) (noting that dickering of terms is not likely to be successful in an adhesion contract
situation).
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and that no employee benefits are designated or even desired.”289 That
is sidestepping the fact that in most jurisdictions, such labels are not
dispositive and that the true question of employee status is a matter to
be decided by a legislature or court.290 Further questionable clauses in
platform terms of service agreements may seek to impose mandatory
binding arbitration.291 Others seek to limit class actions or impose
choice-of-law provisions.
In a recent case from the United Kingdom’s Employment
Tribunal about Uber, the tribunal analyzed the web of contracts
between Uber and its drivers as well as Uber and its passengers in some
depth.292 Regarding the former relationship, the Tribunal was extremely
critical, noting as follows:
[T]he terms on which Uber rely do not correspond with the reality of the
relationship between the organisation and the drivers. Accordingly, the
Tribunal is free to disregard them. As is often the case, the problem stems
at least in part from the unequal bargaining positions of the contracting
parties . . . . Many Uber drivers (a substantial proportion of whom, we
understand, do not speak English as their first language) will not be
289. See Cherry, The Sharing Economy, supra note 97.
290. See discussion supra Part II.
291. For recent accounts of the use of EULAs and pre-dispute mandatory arbitration as
a way of managing workplace liability for employers in the United States, see Jean R.
Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015)
(“Today employers, with substantial assistance from the Supreme Court, are using mandatory
arbitration clauses to ‘disarm’ employees, effectively preventing them from bringing most
individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to justice. It has been estimated that
roughly 20% of the non-unionized American workforce is covered by mandatory arbitration
provisions, and this number may well increase.”). For more on arbitration as a method of
containing costs toward consumers, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 871 (2008) (“We provide the first study of varying
use of arbitration clauses across contracts within the same firms. Using a sample of 26
consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts from large public corporations, we
compared the use of arbitration clauses in firms’ consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Over
three-quarters of the consumer agreements provided for mandatory arbitration but less than
10% of the firms' material nonconsumer, nonemployment contracts included arbitration
clauses. The absence of arbitration provisions in the vast majority of material contracts suggests
that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefer, litigation over arbitration to resolve disputes with
peers. Our data suggest that the frequent use of arbitration clauses in the same firms’ consumer
contracts may be an effort to preclude aggregate consumer action rather than, as often claimed,
an effort to promote fair and efficient dispute resolution.”). But see Christopher R. Drahozal &
Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 433-34 (2010) (discussing issues in previous studies on the use of
arbitration clauses).
292. Aslam & Ors. v. Uber B.V. & Ors., [2016] EW Misc B68, [89] (ET) (28 Oct.
2016), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc/2016/B68.html.
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accustomed to reading and interpreting dense legal documents couched
in impenetrable prose. This is . . . an excellent illustration . . . of “armies
of lawyers” contriving documents in their clients’ interests which simply
misrepresent the true rights and obligations on both sides.293

Instead, the tribunal relied on a discussion of thirteen points of analysis
to show that Uber was not working for the drivers; that instead, the
drivers were working for Uber.294 These points included key issues of
recruitment; control over information regarding the passengers; Uber’s
setting of default routes, pricing structures, conditions on drivers,
instructions for drivers, and the establishment of disciplinary and rating
systems; and that Uber handles complaints from passengers.295
Choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses are certainly useful
for reducing wasteful litigation about where a dispute should be heard
and what rules should apply.296 It is also understandable that platforms
would desire to manage risk. The concern is that if multinational
platform operators can choose the law that they impose through an
adhesive contract, they might decide to pick jurisdictions in which there
either is no law; ones in which there seems to be a favorable precedent
or the likelihood of one; or jurisdictions where labor standards are quite
low.297 In other words, the race to the bottom in labor standards.
The material that I have set out above on choice of law in labor
and employment law cases shows that this approach will not work, at
least not in California, India, and the European Union. And it might not
work in other jurisdictions, if it is determined that platforms are skirting
at the edge of regulation or engaged in strategic forum shopping. In
some countries, that might take the form of national governments
telling platforms that they must classify platform workers as employees
or else they need to do business elsewhere.298
293. Id. at [96].
294. Id. at [92]. The analysis proceeded under the 1996 Act, Section 230(b), referred to
in the decision as a “limb b” type case.
295. Id. at [92].
296. See Posner, supra note 242, at 261-62.
297. Cf. Peter Link, One Small Step for the United States, May Be One Giant Leap for
Seafarers’ Rights, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167, 178-79 (2015) (explaining the race to
the bottom in maritime cases).
298. See, e.g., Eliana Dockterman, Uber and Lyft Are Leaving Austin After Losing
Background Check Vote, TIME (May 8, 2016), http://time.com/4322348/uber-lyft-austinbackground-check-vote/; cf. Johana Bhuiyan, Uber and Didi Are Now Legal in China but the
Struggle to Sign Up Drivers May Continue, VOX (July 28, 2016, 1:42 PM), https://www.
recode.net/2016/7/28/12311362/uber-didi-china-legal (explaining Chinese regulatory guidelines
for Uber drivers such as minimum experience and maximum mileage); Josh Horwitz, One
Year After the Uber-Didi Merger, It’s Only Getting Harder to Hail a Ride in China, QUARTZ
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Private ordering cannot and will not provide a complete solution
to these problems. Because of the power imbalances embodied in many
of the online terms of service used by platforms, they are not the
product of equal bargaining power.299 Traditional choice-of-law
doctrines have recognized this with the Rome Regulation presenting
workers with probably the most favorable structure for enforcing their
rights of the three examined.300 All of the systems recognize that any
choice-of-law rules must work in tandem with the background private
international rules.301
E.

Conflicts of Law in the Gig Economy (Without Choice-of-Law
Clauses)

As of the date of this Article’s publication, no case law, statutes,
directives, or other precedent are on point for dealing with the issues of
jurisdiction, conflict of law, or choice of law and crowdwork platforms
in California, the European Union, or India. Yet with that said, we can
use some of the existing private international law concepts and
precedents discussed above to make some general predictions about
how a court in each of these jurisdictions might consider the issues if
seized with a question that involves multiple jurisdictions and gig
work, without the application of a choice-of-law clause. As there
currently is no live case or controversy where arguments are being
asserted, the discussion herein is of necessity rather abstract.
Beginning with California, a company’s decision to set up its
headquarters or even to host its server in the state of California would
establish the necessary minimum contacts for jurisdiction. Beyond
initial jurisdiction, with California’s territorial turn along with the
governmental interest approach, the location of the other parties
involved would be important.302 Because the questions around
employment of platform workers generally involve a claim that the
platform is the employer and not generally the requester, the requester
seems to fall out of the equation.303 Even though the relationship is

(Aug. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/1045268/one-year-after-the-uber-didi-merger-its-only-gettingharder-to-hail-a-ride-in-china/ (discussing the decline in availability of Uber due to decreased
wages and local laws).
299. See Aslam, EW Misc B68 at [102].
300. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
301. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
302. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
303. See Prassl & Risak, supra note 48, at 630-32.
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triangular, it is difficult to go back as against the requester.304 There
might be an exception through the application of the joint employer
doctrine, in the case of a company that was perhaps posting an
enormous number of tasks to a crowdsourcing platform, creating the
equivalent of a virtual workforce on these platforms. The jurisdictional
issues with minimum contacts would also be true in both the European
Union and India.
In all three jurisdictions, focus would largely remain on the place
where the work was habitually carried out, which is similar to the
received wisdom about where the worker is physically located.305 This
approach will cause major problems for platforms with the need to
comply with many sets of jurisdictional rules and regulations, once
statutes and judicial rulings begin to regulate.306 So, if there is truly a
globalized platform, and it is ethical and wants to comply with the law,
and it has workers from fifty different countries, the platform will need
compliance with all fifty of the regulatory regimes and will also be
subject to suit under all of them. Right now, the process “works”
because there is no regulation, and thus the platforms do what they
want. However, that will not be case five or ten years from now, when
there is regulation.
Thinking about India, specifically, consider Indian private
international law rules.307 Assume that a group of Indian crowdworkers
wanted to bring a claim for wage theft or failure to pay minimum wage
against a platform based in the United States or the European Union.
Note that such situations are commonplace on crowdwork platforms,
where requesters have a great deal of power to reject work, in some
instances not paying the workers who completed the tasks but retaining
the benefit of the work.308 If crowdworkers in India were to bring a
lawsuit in an Indian court, for example,309 the court would have

304. Id.
305. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 121.
306. See Cherry, Global Dimensions, supra note 33, at 487.
307. All of these instances are hypothetical but entirely possible.
308. See Cherry & Poster, supra note 36, at 387; Berg, Income Security, supra note 14,
at 15. In the ILO Survey, some workers noted that the requester could reject their work on a
summary basis, without providing reasons. All of these led to dissatisfaction among those
surveyed.
309. Cf. Tom Batchelor, India to Introduce Minimum Wage for Millions of Workers,
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/indiaminimum-wage-domestic-workers-labour-ministry-a8005711.html (reporting that domestic
workers on zero hours contracts would be covered by the Indian minimum wage laws).
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jurisdiction to hear the case, regardless of the location of the platform,
thanks to the jurisdictional element.
Although Part IV has employed a methodical approach, setting
out the private international law in three jurisdictions, and then
applying the doctrines, though without current concrete cases, the
issues are still nascent. Further, even applying the best knowledge we
have through the toolkit of private international law, many of these
questions do not have cut-and-dried answers. Returning to the
examples provided in the beginning of this Article—what rights would
Syrian national refugees have when temporarily located in a camp in
Jordan, and the platform they use is hosted in the United Kingdom, and
the customers for the website who are trying to learn a language are
located in eighty different countries around the world? If private
ordering will only result in a race to the bottom, and the toolkit of
private international law is unwieldy in its application and yields
uncertain results, we need to look elsewhere for appropriate solutions.
Part V discusses regulatory options and helpful constructs for dealing
with these emergent problems.
V.

REGULATORY OPTIONS AND SOLUTIONS
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it.”
—Alan Kay310

As crowdwork is a genuinely global enterprise, it runs counter to
the received wisdom that labor and employment law is a matter only
for national authorities and local regulation.311 At the moment, the stage
is set for disagreement and conflicting regulations between nations
about how to characterize or even approach the labor problems
associated with gig work.312 Moreover, as with any type of labor
regulation, there is a worry about capital flight and races to the bottom
in labor standards.313 In some ways, these problems are just a
heightened form of some of the enduring and difficult conundrums of
global labor law and the global supply chain.314

310. Elaine Williams, Kay’s Hand Rocks the Cradle of Creativity, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1982, at 13, LexisNexis.
311. See discussion supra Part II.
312. See De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.
313. Indeed, as platforms have few physical assets tying them to any geographic
location, the race to the bottom may present an even more important concern.
314. Arthurs, Extraterritoriality, supra note 65, at 534.
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This Part sets out several strategies for thinking about
transnational regulation of crowdwork and the harmonization that is
necessary for a successful system of international regulation. The first
possibility is to look at regulations, like the European Union’s GDPR,
that of necessity have an extraterritorial reach. Second, one idea that
may prove fruitful would be to examine other employment sectors
where the physical location of workers has been subtracted from the
law’s calculus. The third option might seek to link crowdwork to the
discussion over ethical sourcing throughout the global supply chain.
Corporate social responsibility and corporate codes of conduct can set
best practices and standards for computer crowdwork; these forms of
“soft law” cross borders and are influential. Part V ends by thinking
backwards about preferences for decent crowdwork and then calling
upon national governments, unions, employers, and policymakers to
plan for what compliance looks like. As an international standardsetting body of importance, it is crucial that the ILO continue to study
the problem closely, whether through the mechanism of a committee
of experts or through solicitations for guidelines that might help in the
process of harmonization.
A.

Extraterritorial Reach of Statutes: The Example of the General
Data Protection Regulation

The European Union’s 2018 enactment of the GDPR is of interest
worldwide, applying to any company that collects data from or
employs citizens of the European Union.315 Its expansive jurisdictional
reach and liberal interpretation of “personal data” has created interest
and concern among multinational firms, engendering discussion and
the need for legal insight.316 At a glance, the GDPR pertains to the
processing of personal data “wholly or partly by automated means” or
315. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1(2), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (“This Regulation
protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the
protection of personal data.”). For more on the theoretical background of data protection as a
fundamental right in the European Union, see generally MARIA TZANOU, THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION: NORMATIVE VALUE IN THE CONTEXT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
SURVEILLANCE (2017) (discussing the scope of the right, current state of legal scholarship and
case studies in communications meta data, travel data, financial data, and Internet data
surveillance).
316. See Bryan Dunne, The GDPR Countdown: Employers Are You Ready?—Consent,
MATHESON (May 4, 2018), https://www.matheson.com/news-and-insights/article/the-gdprcountdown-employers-are-you-ready-employee-consent. In addition, consent must be able to
be as easily withdrawn as given, which would open scenarios of consent being withdrawn and
that data requiring expungement.
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where personal data forms part of a filing system.317 A list of the basic
principles of data are set forth in article 5,318 and article 6 sets forth legal
limits for processing the data.319
Perhaps most interestingly for purposes of this Article, in article 3
the GDPR sets out the jurisdiction of the GDPR, which “applies to the
processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an
establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union,” even if the
processing does not take place within a Member State.320 A controller
not established in the Union has it apply to them “by virtue of public
international law.”321 Article 83, among other recitals, states that the
penalties for noncompliance with certain provisions of the GDPR can
range from ten million322 to twenty million Euro yearly.323
The threshold for determining whether someone is offering goods
or services for sale in the European Union is a key point for determining
applicability of the GDPR.324 Recitals in the GDPR mention that
among other things, offering multiple languages, offering payment in
Euro, using domain names of Member States, or offering local
testimonials will trigger GDPR compliance issues.325 Privacy
specialists have also noted that tracking and monitoring of data has a
“wide net,” and they generally urge companies to engage in compliance
measures to see if they fall under the regulations.326 Thus, locating
computer servers in the United States327 does not exempt a company
317. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 2(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (EU).
318. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(f), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35-36. Among these principles are
transparency with the data subject, limitation on collecting purpose, limitation of collecting,
and accuracy.
319. Id. art. 6(1)(a)-(f), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37.
320. Id. art. 3(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32.
321. Id. art. 3(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33.
322. Id. art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 82.
323. Id. art. 83(5), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 83.
324. Kevin Kish, What Does Territorial Scope Mean Under the GDPR?, INT’L ASS’N
PRIVACY PROFS. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-does-territorial-scope-meanunder-the-gdpr/#; see also MEG LETA JONES, CTRL+Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 168-71
(2016) (discussing extraterritorial reach of GDPR and noting controversies).
325. Kish, supra note 324.
326. Id. A few examples of monitoring as analyzed by IAPP include online advertising
based on behavior, fitness tracking, location tracking via apps, and tracking of public
transportation.
327. Aaron Winston, How the EU Can Fine US Companies for Violating GDPR,
SPICEWORKS (June 21, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://community.spiceworks.com/topic/2007530how-the-eu-can-fine-us-companies-for-violating-gdpr. U.S. companies with a physical
presence within the European Union will have the Regulation “enforced directly” upon them
just as it would be for a totally EU-based company. Cf. JONES, supra note 324, at 168 (noting
that enforcement may encounter problems around the world).
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from following the strictures of the GDPR.328 Traditionally the United
States and European Union have been cooperative regarding reciprocal
enforcement of respective laws.329
While the GDPR’s applicability to crowdwork, big data,330 and
people analytics331 shall have to be addressed in other articles, the main
reason for discussing it here is to examine how the regulations of the
European Union on privacy could have an impact on privacy practices
around the world. A similar approach, involving a statute regulating
crowdwork with a far-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction is one
possibility for overcoming the private international law challenges that
crowdwork poses. Although we typically think of employment and
labor regulation as part of national law, the example of the GDPR
should make regulators take notice. Rather than decline to regulate at
all because of problems with jurisdiction, it might make more sense to
learn from the far-reaching implementation of the GDPR.
B.

The Possibility of Sectoral Regulation

Another option for thinking about crowdwork is to compare it to
other forms of work that are divorced from physical location.
Traditionally there are some occupations, such as traveling sales,
transportation workers, or seafarers, which have fallen outside and
apart from the territorial jurisdiction of national regulation.332 In
thinking about solutions to the regulatory and jurisdictional problems
posed by crowdwork, one possible answer is a specific sectoral
approach. Here is a description of some of the issues that maritime
employment law practitioners used to confront:
It is not unusual for a seafarer to work on a vessel registered in a foreign
country, sailing on the high seas and calling at ports in countries other
than that of her flag, owned by citizens of yet other countries, insured in
other countries, perhaps chartered by interests in other countries,
managed by a company in another country, and carrying cargo owned by
citizens of other countries. More than a half-dozen different countries
328. Cf. Kurt Wimmer, Free Expression and EU Privacy Regulation: Can the GDPR
Reach U.S. Publishers?, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 547, 548-49 (2018) (explaining how companies
based outside of the European Union are subject to the GDPR and lawsuits arising from it).
329. See id.
330. See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47
SETON HALL L. REV. 995 (2017) (discussing the problems of the GDPR’s implementation on
Big Data).
331. See Bodie et al., supra note 90, at 987.
332. See MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 31.
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may be directly connected to a vessel's operations. When problems arise,
which country has jurisdiction? Which country's or countries' laws
apply—and what laws within that country affect seafarers?333

These issues sound remarkably similar to the transnational issues
pertaining to gig work and computer crowdwork. While crowdworkers
are not physically traveling in the same way that ships’ crews are, the
work that they produce certainly is in motion, given that it often arrives
from a foreign nation and is sent back to another, while other parts of
the work are being amalgamated from workers in other nations.
Effective international regulation of maritime workers took over
a century of effort to achieve. In the nineteenth century, a seafarer’s life
was a difficult one, with few, if any safeguards against wage theft,
safety hazards, or poor working conditions.334 At that time, the
dominant international law regulating the seas was the centuries-old
concept of freedom of the seas.335 Apart from this paradigm of mare
liberum, antagonistic powers created rigid codes that constituted a
“harmful corollary” of regulation.336 As the amount of goods shipped
at sea increased, so too did concern over potentially exploitative or poor
working conditions for seafarers.337 Positions on ships were often
temporary. Workers faced isolation, enduring separations from friends
and families for months at a time.338 In extreme situations, workers
could find themselves abandoned at foreign ports with no money and
no passage to return home.339
Beginning in 1897, the International Maritime Committee (IMC)
began advocating for greater unification of maritime law and adopted

333. Douglas B. Stevenson, Book Review, 36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 567, 567 (2005)
(reviewing SEAFARER’S RIGHTS (Deirdre Fitzpatrick & Michael Anderson eds., 2005)).
334. GERARD J. MANGONE, UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY LAW 117 (1997) (“From
antiquity to modern times the life of the ordinary seaman has been woeful: exposed to the
frightful perils of the world ocean for months or years; . . . deprived of family or normal human
society for long periods; and, until recently, subjected to the arbitrary command of a master at
sea.”); see also Life Aboard, NEW BEDFORD WHALING MUSEUM, https://www.whaling
museum.org/learn/research-topics/overview-of-north-american-whaling/life-aboard (last visited
Dec. 16, 2019) (describing conditions aboard whaling ships).
335. See ALBERT LILAR & CARLO VAN DEN BOSCH, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
COMMITTEE: 1897-1972, at 4-6 (1972).
336. Id.
337. MANGONE, supra note 334 (noting that the flogging of seamen was not outlawed
in the United States until 1850 and that brutal discipline continued throughout the century, and
that the system of “crimping,” i.e., pressing alcoholics or penniless people onto ships continued
until the late 1800s).
338. Link, supra note 297, at 174.
339. Id.
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regulations and protocols to further harmonization.340 In the ensuing
years, the IMC began to fashion the standards and organization
necessary to provide cooperation between seafaring states.341 In 1948,
the United Nations established a department, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), which had as its goal regulating the
resources of the ocean and the people who work on it.342 The many
international treaties overseen by the IMO include the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)343 and the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), both promulgated
and adopted in the 1970s and 1980s.344 These sets of regulations
established that ship owners would register their ships with a nation
and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the country whose flag
they flew. The duties of a flag state included maintaining a register,
assuming jurisdiction of laws, legal liability, and proper regulations
including compliance with labor conditions.345 However, problems
remained because ships could register with so-called flags of
convenience, states with low standards or lax enforcement that in fact
encouraged a race to the bottom.346
In 2006, under the auspices of the UN-ILO, the International
Labor Conference took up the project of consolidating and
modernizing the sixty-plus instruments that concerned various aspects
of maritime employment in the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC).347
340. F.L. Wiswall, A Brief History, COMITE MAR. INT’L (June 2018), https://comite
maritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/a-brief-history-wiswall.pdf.
341. Nigel H. Frawley, A Brief History: The CMI and Its Relationship with IMO, the
IOPC Funds and Other UN Organisations, COMITE MAR. INT’L (Jan. 7, 2011), https://
comitemaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/A-brief-History-Frawlye.pdf. Over time, IMO
would adopt most of CMI’s protocols.
342. Brief History of IMO, IMO, www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryofIMO/pages/Default.
aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
343. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) pmbl., Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
344. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. II-1, Nov. 11, 1974, 1184
U.N.T.S. 289. See generally Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 41 INT’L L. 671,
671 (2007) (discussing UNCLOS, international security, agreements, disputes, and the law of
the sea in U.S. federal courts).
345. UNCLOS, supra note 343, art. 94.
346. See Tina Shaughnessy & Ellen Tobin, Flags of Inconvenience: Freedom and
Insecurity on the High Seas, 5 U. PA. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2006-2007); see also Link, supra
note 297, at 178-79 (noting race to the bottom).
347. Maritime Labour Convention pmbl., Feb. 23, 2006, 2952 U.N.T.S. 7; see also
Iliana Christodoulou-Varotsi, Critical Review of the Consolidated Maritime Labour
Convention (2006) of the International Labour Organization: Limitations and Perspectives,
43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 467, 468 (2012) (noting the ILO has adopted more than sixty instruments
on labor conditions).
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Every seafarer under the MLC has a right to working conditions that
comply with international standards, fair terms of employment,
medical care, and decent living conditions, and these rights are set out
in five titles.348 Title I sets forth minimum and basic requirements, such
as age requirements, adequate training, and employment notification
standards.349 Title II covers the conditions of employment, including
notice of termination periods, regular wage payment and calculation,
hours, leave, repatriation, and compensation.350 Title III concerns
decency of accommodation and recreation, including quality of food
served aboard.351 Title IV ensures adequate healthcare provisions,
places liability for workers’ health on the owner of the ship, requires
safety standards to be followed, and provides for social insurance for
seafarers.352
Finally, Title V discusses the enforcement of the other titles. Each
signatory must agree to implementation through authorization of
compliance inspections and maintaining Maritime Labor Certificates
certifying compliance once those inspections are complete.353 Title V
also concerns inspections in port states, complaint procedures on shore,
and maintenance of the labor supply.354 The goal of the MLC is to
ensure parity of maritime laborers with those performing the same
types of tasks on land.
Since its promulgation in 2006 and its effectuation in 2013, the
MLC can by all accounts be considered a success. As of the date of this
writing, eighty-two states have ratified the convention.355 While that
may only sound like half of the states needed, the MLC actually covers
over ninety percent of the tonnage shipped.356 Because ships can be
stopped and checked for violations by the flag state, the port of
departure, and the port of entry, regulators in many different countries

348. Maritime Labour Convention, supra note 347, at 10, art. IV.
349. Id. tit. I, regulations 1.1-1.4, at 19-27.
350. Id. tit. II, regulations 2.1-2.3, at 28-35.
351. Id. tit. III, regulation 3.2., at 54-56.
352. Id. tit. IV, regulations 4.1-4.3, at 57-70.
353. Id. tit. V, regulations 5.1.1-5.1.4, at 76-86.
354. Id. tit. V, regulations 5.2-5.3., at 88-93.
355. MLC, 2006: What It Is and What It Does, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/
standards/maritime-labour-convention/what-it-does/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Dec. 16,
2019).
356. Id.
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have uniform measures to ensure that wages have been paid and that
working conditions onboard are safe for seafarers.357
Some issues present in maritime employment stand out as directly
applicable to the situation and status of online crowdworkers.358 Both
the jobs on many online work sites and the crewing of a ship are meant
as temporary or transitory, lasting only as long as the job. There is
potential for social isolation in both types of work. On a ship, this is
because of physical distance from family and friends. With computer
crowdwork, because the work is performed in isolation, rather than in
a workplace. The specter of wage theft is a shared threat as well.
However, the most striking parallel is, of course, the international
aspect of both types of work with work being transitory and mobile. In
the case of the maritime worker, that is because the job of necessity
involves transport and travel over long distances. In the case of online
crowdworkers, work is being generated, sent, processed, and stored in
many different locations and fellow workers are located around the
world.
As such, crowdwork might benefit from the type of sectoral
regulation that exists in maritime employment. That would mean
regulations specifically crafted and tailored to fit the requirements,
special issues, and needs of online crowdworkers. Like the ports that
can check for compliance with the MLC, various host or entry points
could be checked for compliance in the network that comprises
crowdwork. Because the workers behind the platform are largely
invisible, such regulatory checks would necessarily involve the
turnover of data.
The idea of sectoral regulation is likely controversial. I have no
doubt there are some academics writing about labor relations who
would object to the idea that crowdwork is in any way different than
offline work or deserving of special status or treatment. This group
might complain that crowdwork is not a sui generis type of
employment that deserves its own set of rules. The reasoning would be
that if crowdworkers are treated as a special category, they would
somehow not be seen as deserving of the same kinds of labor rights that
other workers have. One response would be to refer to the other types

357. Link, supra note 297, at 190 (advocating that the United States ratify the Maritime
Labour Convention).
358. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 596; Cherry &
Poster, supra note 36, at 307; Penfold, supra note 253, at 91.
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of workers that receive sectoral regulation and to point to the benefits
that have accrued to them.
C.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Global Supply Chains, and
Best Practices for Crowdwork

The issue of fair standards for online work has connections to
existing issues that have already been discussed in the context of global
supply chains for products. Global supply chains may obscure poor
labor practices by dispersing businesses geographically and breaking
down the operations, functions, and participants in work into many
segments, some of which involve invisible labor.359 Through global
labor arbitrage, multinational companies may move jobs to countries
where hiring workers is less expensive, where they can save money on
rent and physical infrastructure, and where they may receive
exemptions from legal regulations in return for foreign investment.360
The phenomenon is now standard for business practice: approximately
eighty percent of Fortune 500 companies in the United States outsource
some of their functions abroad, and a large percentage of that
outsourcing is to the global south.361 Unfortunately, there is little
transparency in these global supply chains for products, and because
foreign workers are largely invisible to the parent company and
consumers, poor working conditions can prevail. For example, in 2014,
a fire and building collapse in Bangladesh killed over 1100 workers
who were sewing clothes for American labels including Walmart,
Target, and The Gap.362 Due to the growth of crowdwork and many of
the trends that accompany the trend toward increasingly temporary and
precarious work arrangements, it is important to think about how these
new forms of work fit into the existing legal regulation of work,
including the need to trace labor in global supply chains. If regulation
along a global supply chain is a problem, then corporate social

359. See Miriam A. Cherry, Virtual Work and Invisible Labor, in INVISIBLE LABOR:
HIDDEN WORK IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 52 (Marion G. Crain et al. eds., 2016)
[hereinafter Cherry, Invisible Labor].
360. See David J. Doorey, In Defense of Transnational Domestic Labor Regulation, 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 953, 987-88 (2010) (exhaustive treatment of issues with global supply
chains in Canada).
361. DELOITTE, GLOBAL OUTSOURCING AND INSOURCING SURVEY 7 (2014).
362. Steven Greenhouse & Elizabeth A. Harris, Battling for a Safer Bangladesh, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/international/battlingfor-a-safer-bangladesh-html (describing garment factory collapse).
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responsibility and corporate codes of conduct may help to provide an
answer.
Corporate social responsibility takes a wider view of a
corporation’s purpose than a single-minded focus on shareholder
primacy and profit.363 Generally, corporate social responsibility means
managing a business with equal regard for the triple bottom line,364 that
is financial performance, environmental consequences and labor
standards, and social impact.365 In addition to “the traditional bottom
line of financial performance (most often expressed in terms of profits,
return on investment (ROI), or shareholder value)” a firm should also
mind its “impact on the broader economy, the environment, and on the
society in which [it] operate[s].”366 In fact, this triple focus often
improves firms’ financial bottom lines as much as it helps the
environment and society. To take one example, efforts to reduce waste
and pollution often result in greater efficiency and the discovery of
innovative techniques and materials.367
Compliance with labor standards is often discussed as a form of
corporate social responsibility. But following the law, surely, is a basic
obligation of corporations, as well as citizens. How then is basic
compliance considered socially responsible? It helps to think of
363. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Jonathan R.
Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
177, 181-84 (2008); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
290-91 (1998).
364. See generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM
LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1998) (advocating for companies to pursue corporate social
responsibility to ensure future market success).
365. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2001) (positing that a firm best
maximizes its long-term value by tending to all of its stakeholder groups); Marc Orlitzky et al.,
Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403, 427
(2003) (“[P]ortraying managers’ choices with respect to [sustainability] and [profitability] as
an either/or trade-off is not justified in light of 30 years of empirical data.”).
366. See ANDREW W. SAVITZ WITH KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW
TODAY’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SUCCESS—AND HOW YOU CAN TOO, at xii (2006). Elkington notes that, by considering society
and the environment, the triple bottom line internalizes costs that firms would otherwise
externalize. See ELKINGTON, supra note 364, at 92-94, 307 (discussing the “full cost
accounting” method of “assessing the total cost of making, using, and disposing of products”).
367. See ELKINGTON, supra note 364, at 314 (discussing DuPont’s successful ninetynine percent reduction in toxic emissions at a Texas plant—“achieved through the use of
closed-loop recycling, off-site reclamation, selling former wastes as products, and substituting
raw materials”—which saved “$2.5 million of capital and more than $3 million in annual
operating costs”); see also SAVITZ WITH WEBER, supra note 366, passim (containing numerous
such anecdotes).
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corporate social responsibility as a type of continuum, with firms
integrating these concepts in their operations to varying degrees. At one
end of the spectrum, a firm may have no ambition to be socially
responsible and in fact be out of compliance with applicable labor and
environmental laws and regulations.368 At this stage, the focus is on
profits to the exclusion of all other considerations and the firm may
even deliberately violate laws in order to maximize corporate profits.
Slightly more socially responsible is the firm that complies with
applicable laws and perhaps engages in generic corporate philanthropy
but does little beyond that.369 These firms see “no business case” for
going beyond compliance or serving stakeholders’ interests.370 To these
firms, “the business of business is business” and by bare compliance
(and paying taxes) they see themselves as fulfilling their societal
obligations.371 A third type of firm moves beyond bare compliance but
only does so where it would be profitable.372 These firms may view
corporate social responsibility primarily as a public relations matter, for
particularly in consumer-focused industries, social responsibility
attracts customers and social irresponsibility repels.373 These
368. See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate
Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. 831, 857 (2008) [hereinafter
Kerr, Creative Capitalism] (arranging corporate social responsibility levels along a spectrum);
Marcel van Marrewijk & Marco Werre, Multiple Levels of Corporate Sustainability, 44 J. BUS.
ETHICS 107, 112 (2003) (terming this level “pre-corporate sustainability”). Interestingly,
Marrewijk and Werre derive their levels of corporate social responsibility from Clare Graves’s
psychology research on value systems and levels of existence. See Marrewijk & Werre, supra,
at 107.
369. See SUSTAINABILITY LTD., GEARING UP: FROM CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SCALABLE SOLUTIONS 34-37 (2004) [hereinafter GEARING UP]
(terming this category “compliance”); Kerr, Creative Capitalism, supra note 368, at 857
(terming this category “mere [or] reactive compliance”); Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 368,
at 112 (terming this category “compliance-driven” corporate sustainability).
370. See GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 35.
371. See id. (paraphrasing Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17); Kerr, Creative Capitalism, supra
note 368, at 640.
372. See GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 35 (labeling this type of firm a corporate social
responsibility “volunteer”); Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 368, at 112 (describing this level
as “profit-driven” corporate sustainability).
373. See Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How
the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 664-65 (2007) (citing studies measuring “a strong
positive relationship between CSR behaviors and consumers’ reactions to a company’s
products and services”); Ray Fisman et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well by
Doing Good? 1 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), pdfs.semanticscholar.org/389a/
e50f1d85a6d6941762a5d90effcfd4f7471b.pdf (noting that corporate social responsibility is
more positively related to profitability in advertising-intensive, consumer-oriented industries).
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companies may also pursue a socially responsible agenda to save
resources, reduce waste, achieve production efficiencies, and anticipate
changing conditions, regulations, and consumer preferences.374 These
firms may incorporate environmental, ethical, and social
considerations at all levels of their operations and decision making, but
only act upon them when it would benefit their financial bottom
lines.375
A fourth type of firm routinely balances economic, social, and
environmental considerations and does so not in order to comply with
applicable laws or to make a profit.376 Rather, these firms are motivated
by altruism to “do good”—for their various constituencies and for the
planet—while still producing handsome returns for their
shareholders.377 These firms also tend to be more proactive, partnering
with government, “suppliers, customers, [and] others in the[ir]
industry” to together innovate sustainable solutions to environmental
and other problems.378 At the next level of corporate social
responsibility, firms integrate social responsibility principles into their
strategy and business processes (starting with product or service
development) such that the way of doing business is “built in, not
bolted on.”379 For example, companies at this stage may rethink their
design and production processes to reduce waste, utilize improved,
sustainable, and even reusable materials, and in some cases eliminate
the use of harmful materials altogether. These firms aim to serve all
This may be the case in business-to-business transactions, as well. See ELKINGTON, supra note
364, at 110, 119 (relating anecdotes).
374. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 291 (2007) (noting that “sophisticated corporate
managers” are “tak[ing] into account the possibility of increased governmental regulation; the
increasing risk of a costly response to changing environmental conditions . . . .; and growing
consumer preference for products sold by companies that are good corporate citizens”).
375. See Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 368, at 110.
376. See GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 36 (labeling this the “partner” level); Kerr,
Creative Capitalism, supra note 368, at 857-58 (labeling these firms “pro-active” in corporate
social responsibility); Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 368, at 112 (describing this level as
“caring” corporate sustainability).
377. See Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 368, at 112.
378. See CYNTHIA A. MCEWEN & JOHN D. SCHMIDT, AVASTONE CONSULTING
LEADERSHIP AND THE CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE 14 (2007); Marrewijk &
Werre, supra note 368, at 110.
379. McEwen & Schmidt, supra note 378, at 17 (quoting a pharmaceutical
manufacturer’s vice president of corporate responsibility) (“What you have to do is build
responsibility into every aspect of the way you do business, so it’s built in, not bolted on.”);
see GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 36 (labeling this level “integrate”); Marrewijk & Werre,
supra note 368, at 112 (describing this level as “synergistic” corporate sustainability).
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their stakeholders, creating value for shareholders, by matching
“corporate objectives [with] wider societal challenges.”380 At the sixth
and highest level, corporate social responsibility “is fully integrated and
embedded in every aspect of the organization,” which is committed to
“contributing to the quality and continuation of life of every being and
entity, now and in[to] the future.”381 Here, companies also redesign or
“reengineer” their business models, financial institutions, and markets
to identify and root out any underlying causes inconsistent with social
responsibility. Aside from a few outliers,382 however, corporate social
responsibility rarely moves beyond the third, profit-driven level
described above. This encompasses a great deal of socially responsible
behavior and business practices, to be sure.
Specifically for global labor standards, many approaches have
tended to focus on the level of the articulation of corporate codes of
conduct and compliance with those codes.383 Several studies report that
socially responsible business practices tend to be profitable,384 and the
380. See GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 36.
381. Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 368, at 112 (terming this level “holistic” corporate
sustainability); see GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 36 (calling this level “re-engineer”); Kerr,
Creative Capitalism, supra note 368, at 857 (calling this “creative capitalism”).
382. See, e.g., Murray Carpenter, A Coffee Conundrum: Disposal of Single-Use Pods
Offsets Eco-Friendliness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at B1 (profiling Green Mountain Coffee
Roasters); Cornelia Dean, Executive on a Mission: Saving the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2007, at F1 (profiling Ray Anderson of Interface Carpets); Tom Foster, “No Such Thing as
Sustainability,” FAST COMPANY, July 1, 2009, Business Source Complete, Doc. No.
10859241; Sarah Lyall, Anita Roddick, Body Shop Founder, Dies at 64, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/world/europe/12roddick.html; Andrew Martin,
Is a Food Revolution Now in Season?: In Washington, the Gardener in Chief Embraces the
Activists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU1 (interviewing Stonyfield Farms CE-Yo Gary
Hirshberg); Booth Moore, Toms Shoes: The Model: Sell 1, Give 1, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009,
at P5; Danielle Sacks, Jeffrey Hollender: Seventh Generation, Triple Bottom Line
Entrepreneur, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 2, 2010), https://www.fastcompany.com/1535762/
jeffrey-hollender-seventh-generation-triple-bottom-line-entrepreneur; Seth Goldman: Brewing
Organic Tea with a Mission-Based Business Model, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Dec. 23,
2008), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2124 (interviewing Honest
Tea cofounder and TeaEO Seth Goldman).
383. See Elisa Westfield, Note, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational
Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
1075, 1079 (2002).
384. See Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does It Pay to Be Good? A Meta-Analysis and
Redirection of Research on the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial
Performance 21 (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/5013/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1866371. The percentages do not total one hundred because thirteen percent
of the studies did not use statistically significant sample sizes. An earlier meta-study reached
similar results. See Orlitzky et al., supra note 365 (“[P]ortraying managers’ choices with
respect to [sustainability] and [profitability] as an either/or trade-off is not justified in light of
30 years of empirical data.”). A more recent, individual study concludes that voluntary
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popular business press is replete with anecdotal evidence in further
support of this hypothesis.385 While corporate codes of conduct are
typically voluntary,386 and thus an exercise in “soft law,” they can be
extremely important sources of self-regulation and also a way for
industries to develop “best practices.”387 Those best practices of an
industry often form the basis for the starting point of regulation. After
all, industry leaders who have participated in and helped to craft the
codes of conduct and who are already meeting those standards are most
likely to endorse compliance. In fact, such codes provide a type of “buy
in” for those industry leaders who would rather compete on a level
playing field, free from competitors who ignore or flout minimum labor
standards.
In the crowdwork sector, such efforts have already begun. As
noted in my coauthored book, Invisible Labor, “Technology may hide
workers from a Web site’s ultimate users or consumers, who . . . may
not even know that a human is working at all.”388 Labor activists have
attempted to change this dynamic over the years, through protests
specifically designed to make workers more visible. In 2015, Stanford
researchers and crowdworkers organized the Dynamo campaign,
which was described as “a community platform designed to gather
ideas, energy, and support directed towards collective action.”389 A
primary focus of Dynamo was overcoming the twin issues that seemed
to be opposing collective action in the sector, which they described as

overcompliance beyond applicable environmental regulations does sacrifice shareholder
profits, albeit only very slightly. See Karen Fisher-Vanden & Karin S. Thorburn, Voluntary
Corporate Environmental Initiatives and Shareholder Wealth 7 (CEPR Discussion Paper No.
DP6698, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141020 (reporting
that overcompliance depressed firms’ stock prices by about one percent).
385. See, e.g., ELKINGTON, supra note 364, at 314; SAVITZ, supra note 366, passim;
Allison Linn, Wal-Mart Aims to Cut Energy Use—and Costs, NBCNEWS (Apr. 19, 2007, 8:23
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/18075223/ns/business-going-green/t/wal-mart-aims-cutenergy-use-costs/#.xwhkxihkiuk..
386. Professor Afra Afsharipour has analyzed the fact that certain Indian provinces have
made corporate codes of conduct mandatory and enforced through a tax regime, with a
percentage of profits to be turned over to social causes. See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Directors
as Trustees of the Nation? India’s Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
Reform Efforts, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 995, 1018-24 (2011); Afra Afsharipour & Shruti Rana,
The Emergence of New Corporate Social Responsibility Regimes in China and India, 14 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 175, 208-26 (2013).
387. See GEARING UP, supra note 369, at 18, 31.
388. Cherry, Invisible Labor, supra note 359, at 50.
389. Niloufar Salehi et al., We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction in
Collective Action for Crowd Workers, 2015 CHI 1621, 1621 (conference paper).
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“stalling” and “friction.”390 Two of Dynamo’s initiatives secured
significant media attention: the articulation of guidelines for academic
researchers and a letter-writing campaign targeted at Amazon CEO Jeff
Bezos.391
The guidelines were aimed at academic researchers, who
commonly post surveys, psychological tests, and other similar tasks
online. Many of the tasks came under fire because of the low rates of
pay offered. Amazon now officially suggests that requesters use
Dynamo’s Guidelines for Academic Requesters as a basis “[t]o help
new Requesters get started successfully with MTurk.”392 The
guidelines include standards of identification, timeliness, and fair
pay.393 As such, this part of the Dynamo effort seems to have had a
lasting impact.
Codes of conduct prompt a discussion of what “socially
responsible” or “sustainable” online or app platforms might look like.
In fact, some of the platforms might actually be run and owned by
crowdworkers. Professors Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider have
written extensively about platform cooperatives.394 Rather than work
for a wage, workers who are also cooperative owners are able to keep
most of the money earned from their platform. Only a percentage of
their earnings go back to the platform in order to invest in upkeep and
functionality, rather than pay dividends out to shareholders.
Even in businesses not owned by workers, we could imagine
socially responsible on-demand platforms. First, we should assume that
such a business wanting to establish such norms would likely adhere to
a corporate code of conduct and corporate social responsibility
norms.395 These would encompass the idea of fair remuneration and
compliance with minimum wage laws. Disclosure and transparency are
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1626.
392. How to Be a Great MTurk Requester, HAPPENINGS MTURK (Sept. 10, 2017),
https://blog.mturk.com/how-to-be-a-great-mturk-requester-3a714d7d7436.
393. Id.
394. OURS TO HACK AND TO OWN: THE RISE OF PLATFORM COOPERATIVISM, A NEW
VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WORK AND A FAIRER INTERNET (Trebor Scholz & Nathan Schneider
eds., 2016); see also Eillie Anzilotti, Worker-Owned Co-Ops Are Coming for the Digital Gig
Economy, FAST COMPANY (May 31, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40575728/workerowned-co-ops-are-coming-for-the-digital-gig-economy (noting the potential replacement of
major platforms by worker-owned co-ops); Trebor Scholz, Platform Cooperativism vs. The
Sharing Economy, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2014), https://medium.com/@trebors/platformcooperativism-vs-the-sharing-economy-2ea737f1b5ad (imagining a movement for better
working conditions on crowdworking platforms).
395. For more on this point, see Cherry & Poster, supra note 36, at 293.
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also important, so that workers understand the projects they are
working on (and supporting through their labor).396 Finally, there would
be procedural safeguards for workers on platforms. If there are rating
systems that are being built up over time, then workers should be able
to have access to that data.397 It is also important to ensure for
procedural protections so that wage theft does not occur if the work is
performed, but the task is “rejected.” As these soft law standards
develop, we can hope for a code of conduct for crowdwork that applies
regardless of jurisdiction, and that balances the needs of gig workers
along with those of the platforms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Online crowdwork presents endlessly fascinating conflicts-oflaw, jurisdiction, and choice-of-law problems that will only become
more salient as platforms become more established, more legal systems
begin to enforce existing regulations or pass new ones, and the legal
issues around the gig economy reach an increasing number of
legislatures and courts. This Article has sought, on a practical level, to
work through the labyrinth of doctrinal issues, using the available
toolkit of private international law and its intersection with nationally
based labor and employment laws. The analysis, however, only serves
to point out the shortcomings of the existing laws and approaches.
Working through the maze of corporate compliance concerns and
labor standards issues that global crowdwork has created exposes far
deeper fault lines in the territorial-based approach to labor and
employment law. As long as the focus for regulation remains on
“workplaces” and physical locations where work is performed,
effective regulation of crowdwork will remain elusive. Returning to the
Introduction, there will be no easy answers for what law to apply to
TaskRabbit, Upwork, or Chatterbox. Rather than focus on geographical
approaches, this Article has tried to marshal a number of suggestions,
looking at extraterritorial applications of law, sectoral regulation, and
the soft law of corporate codes of conduct, to provide the possibility for
ways forward. Socially responsible crowdwork is possible, but it will
require creative thinking and the cooperation of platforms, workers,
and regulatory organizations.

396. Id. at 302-07.
397. Id. at 307.

